Defence Committee - Additional (Unprinted) Written Evidence
The Strategic Defence and Security Review and the National Security Strategy
(2011)
https://publications.parliament.uk/p...61/761vw01.htm
This is a treasure trove of information on the Harrier/Tornado and Nimrod issues (the later study acknowledges they were both the wrong decision and derides the manner in which the decisions were taken).
Looking at Appendix 1, parts near the bottom are very interesting, especially regarding the Harrier/Tornado decision.
Annex C: What is Lost by Withdrawing the Harrier?
Annex D: Retention in Service Cost Comparison—Tornado v. Harrier
Annex B: JOINT FORCE HARRIER—MIGRATION TO FUTURE JOINT COMBAT AIRCRAFT
Annex D makes specific reference to Harmony policy differences and acknowkedges this will have a significant impact on operations and strategy.
I was curious as to how this would affect carrier F-35B force and if there would be impact on normal peace time carrier operations. Concerns raised were that there would be more inconvenience and cost caused by the difference in harmony policy. 'Blooded' crews would be replaced by 'newbies', which would dilute effectiveness of the crews for a period, plus the cost and effort to replace crews mid-cruise.
I know the F-35 simulator has been praised highly, but I assumed it would still take a new crew time to qualify and acclimatise to carrier operations. I was also curious as to normal non-combat peace time cruises; would RAF crews rotate mid-cruise?
The concerns raised seemed sound, especially when considered over the life-time of carrier cruises, where the cumulative additional cost of replacing crews mid-cruise could be a significant sum.
How will this be handled in peace time and in combat; will RAF F-35B pilots be rotated mid-cruise?
You need to bear in mind that the above sections you focus upon were largely the work of that unbiased analyst Sharkey Ward. That is not to say that the annexes don't contain valid points (for they do), but they were part of an increasingly unsubtle 'we hate the RAF' campaign which was in many ways hugely counter-productive. This was perhaps best demonstrated when Admiral Zambellas made it very clear that any naval officers, retired or serving, who attempted a repetition of the 2010 efforts would find themselves on the naughty step.
Although published by the committee, this is because it's evidence - and that can be submitted by anyone (I'm being generic here, not talking about this submission) ranging from the person recognised as the world's leading authority on the subject through to some fruitloop with a computer who writes their submission while wearing a tin-foil hat to stop the CIA from reading their brainwaves.
I'm not, for clarity, saying that the submission is/was worthless, merely that you ought not to take it as gospel given that there was a very, very deep dark blue bias towards the way in which certain statistics, etc, were interpreted.