Originally Posted by
mross
According to the AD bulletin, one of the effects of an AoA sensor failure is 'stick shaker on the affected side only'. So the computers can use 'logic' to determine this.
For clarity, there is no "AD Bulletin" There is an AD (Airworthiness Directive, AD #: 2018-23-51) and a "Flight Crew Operations Manual Bulletin" (TBC-19) The same-side stick shaker is mentioned in the manual bulletin, but not in the Emergency AD. Edit: Actually, it *is* mentioned in the AD, I apparently hadn't read the AD completely. Apologies for that.
That aside, I'm not convinced that this is the computer using logic to determine whcih data is bad. This seems more of a case of of how the problem is manifesting itself with an unintended symptom in a complex system, rather than a case of the Computer, in effect, saying : "Hmmmm, we've determined that the left AoA sensor is giving us bad data, so because we know this isn't really a stall AoA situation, we're only going to activate the stick shaker on the left side instead of both sides"