From #978, operator system description and actions.
“… as pilots, that once we recognize the issue, we can stop the negative impacts by taking the trim system out of the loop.”
Recognition is paramount.
A pedantic Point; most of the discussion is about trim, whereas the device is an augmentation system which interfaces with trim as the output.
Questions for clarity; does the trim-wheel move when the MCAS is active? Is it a serial or parallel design ?
If no movement, then in piloting terms MCAS has no meaningful visual relationship with the conventional use of trim; thus the critical action is to take MCAS out of the loop not trim per se.
It is difficult to recognise the situation without first experiencing the out-of-trim force (in simulation, are simulators so equipped ?), and with demonstration, to understand the combinations of associated alerts, both visual and audio, so as not to confuse this specific situation with any other involving individual input failures.
There was no prior description provided for pilots. How about engineering / maintenance, or at least in a reasonable guide for troubleshooting.
Was the FAA aware; their flight ops, training, airworthiness (monitoring previous events), certification ?
Learning for safety; which was the initiating event; which were enabling factors - ‘holes in the cheese’
Regrettably this event has great learning potential for the industry; if only …
“...no matter how hard they try, humans can never be expected to out perform the system which bounds and constrains them. Organisational flaws will, sooner or later, defeat individual human performance.”
“Responsibility lies with those who could act but do not, it lies with those who could learn but do not and for those who evaluate it can add to their capacity to make interventions which might make all our lives the safer.”
Phillip Capper – ‘Systems safety in the wake of the cave creek disaster.’