Flying Bull - As a TRI/TRE, its important to teach the items that provide the very best possible outcome to any emergency situation. The Certification requirements centred around preserving battery life in the event of a double generator failure, require the OEMs to make harsh decisions as to what electrical services should be shed when the second generator fails. It is for this reason, and this reason only, that the RADALT and Landing Light are lost (along with many other electrical consumers) when both Generators fail. It is the "Default" condition with no generators on line.
Following such a condition, the pilot has the option to override certain default load shed items. In the EC135 series, this is accomplished by overriding the automatic shedding of the emergency bus by lifting the guard and making the switch. In the EC135. this switch provides power back to the Landing Light and RADALT along with a number of other important items. In open flight with the engines operating normally, the pilot can then opt to remove certain items to manage his battery life to a successful landing.
In this accident, the generators dropped off line as they are driven by the engines. It was dark. Clearly the RADALT and the Landing Light would greatly add value to an EOL conducted at night OR a relight managed by reference to the RADALT (although at the height he was in this case, this option was technically impossible).
Therefore, understanding the importance of the switch is the first aim. The second is to facilitate a greater understanding of what is important should an EOL become imminent.
As such, you are correct, the first action is to successfully enter autorotation. This can only really be achieved if proper and appropriate training has been given to overcome the startle effect and generate resilience to the pilots response. There is simply no substitute for repetitive training leading to scenarios where the Double Engine failure is unexpected with the aim of provoking a well rehearsed set of muscles memory actions to get into autorotation.
Key to this first aim, is when one engine has failed, the pilot monitors appropriately. This MUST be by reference to the NR Gauge ONLY and not the VMS or other engine instruments. The reason for this is if the muscle memory reactions (collective down) has been carried out, and speed maybe reducing or increasing as required, the remaining engine indications are in constant motion leading to confusion. If the pilot is well practiced in doing all these OEI handling techniques whilst his eyes are fixed on the NR gauge, he stands the best possible chance of reacting to the second engine failing.
After autorotation has been successfully achieved, the priorities of what he does next are really important.
A RELIGHT consideration is number 1. If a relight is not appropriate due to Height etc. Now the aircraft must be prepared for the EOL.
The RADALT will always help day and night (BUS SHED OVRD SWITCH), the Landing Light good to have at night but nowhere near as important as the RADALT.
All fuel pumps must be OFF to reduce the risks of post impact fire.
Should we waste time securing engines which have already failed...………..I remain unconvinced.
Understanding and sound TKI knowledge are important. If Dave's accident is not to be in vain, we should learn from it without prejudice or criticism of his individual performance.
I say this as my thought processes, my understanding and the teaching and training I now deliver are heavily influenced by what happened to Dave that night. I spend a lot more time with recurrent candidates developing resilience to a sudden double engine failure and a lot more time getting them to make a successful EOL by reference to the RADALT and AI until the final cushion.