Originally Posted by
krismiler
The Boeing philosophy is to have the pilot fly the aircraft where as Airbus want the automation to do it. Regardless of which manufacture's aircraft you are flying, the pilot needs to be able to deal with control system malfunctions. Engine fire/failure is regularly practiced and tested, as are RTOs and TCAS, perhaps stick and rudder ability needs to be looked at as well. Accidents such as this one highlight a lack of basic flying skills which is sadly becoming more common as pilots move straight from basic training onto highly automated aircraft.
Everything is fine as long as the automatics behave themselves and nothing occurs which isn't covered in the manuals, though in this case it seems it was covered by a laid down procedure.
This could have been prevented if any one link in the accident chain had been broken, failures in equipment, maintenance and flight crew all coincided and the chain held.
Except the cause of the trim behavior (AOA sensor invalid) in this case wasn’t understood to affect the STS, or even that this was an AOA sensor related issue. The use of AOA within the STS system is a ‘new’ feature for the MAX, and I’m pretty sure this exact malfunction isn’t even available on any flight sim currently, leaving the crew facing an array of failures (no AP, UAS indications, stick-shaker) and the trim system surreptitiously winding on nose down trim.
The armchair coach pretty much always wins the game, but even with clear hindsight I don’t believe anyone had pinned the exact cause of the crash prior to the Boeing AD.
All I can say is it was a good job the FDR was found, because that was what let the cat out the bag with respect to this being AOA sensor related and linked to the STS.
- GY