Multum,
I'd like, if I may, to make a couple of observations here. Yes, the RAF organisation needs to look forward and change to meet new needs. It also needs to look back and make sure that what went wrong doesn't go wrong again. However, it needs to recognise what actually went wrong. It may not.
The RAF's maintenance organisation for gliders wasn't subject to 'cessation' - nor was outsourcing 'forced' - these were both deliberate decisions by the RAF and MoD departments all of which, by that time, were RAF led and manned. The main source of the ATC's problems was, in my view (opinion here but backed up by my FOI research) the mismanaged procurement and support of an extremely large fleet of composite gliders and powered aircraft. The RAF simply didn't properly execute the basic, simple, easy (I'm running out of synonyms here) steps that should have been second nature to any military aircraft procurement organisation. Once in service, they failed to properly execute the basic first and second line support and maintenance functions for which they were accountable.
As to the 'imposition of a safety regime designed for fast jets' - sorry, it would be nice if this were the cause, but in my view it wasn't. The MAA was designed and implemented in response to the Haddon-Cave inquiry's criticisms of their airworthiness regime. This effort was, in very large part, led by senior RAF officers, who designed and built the MAA regime the Services work under today. It's designed for all military aircraft, and while it is bureaucratic and overly proscriptive (in my view) complying with it it should be straightforward for any professional operating and support organisation. The fact that 2FTS was demonstrably neither of these when the MAA 'came calling' in 2012/13 was not the MAA's fault. It was the RAF's
The other aspect that the RAF badly needs to recognise is the utter shambles that followed the 'pause' (grounding). It took 2FTS and the MoD departments involved two years to get any sort of handle on the technical issues, risks, costs and timescales of recovering any part of the ATC fleet. To repeat a line I've often used - the RAF had been flying schoolchildren in its non-airworthy military aircraft. How much more of an emergency did it need to get the situation sorted out? It's only the indifference and ignorance of what passes for a 'defence press' in the UK that saved the RAF from a
PR disaster. Oh, and a few judicious lies told to MPs and ministers.
Finally, as an ex Air Cadet I most strongly support those who point out the 'people skills' aspect of the ATC and the gliding organisation it ran. It gave callow teenagers like me an unforgettable set of lessons in independence, team working and decision making that was second to none. Flying a jobbed up Xbox flight sim programme around simply doesn't cut it in the least. In my view. That said, I'll end in the usual way:
Best Regards as ever to all those working to enthuse, inspire and lead today's Air Cadets. You are doing a great service to young people.
Engines