I just cannot believe that one faulty AOA sensor can make the aircraft trim nose down. There has to be more protection in the system design for this not to happen.
In the B777 which I am familiar with, each of the two ADIRUs (Air Data Inertial reference unit) receive both AOA inputs (There are two AOA sensors on most aircraft, same config on B737 also). This is compared with 'Calculated AOA' and a mid value is used. This is the redundancy built in the system on B777. Also each of the AOA sensor has two outputs, feed into two different computational channels. See the redundancy. There are actually 4 signals from two AOA sensors.
The full text from the B777 AMM is as below.
AOA Redundancy Management
The AOA redundancy management logic uses a modified midvalue selection.
The modified mid-value selection chooses the mid-value of these three AOA values:
* Left corrected AOA
* Right corrected AOA
* Calculated AOA.
The AOA redundancy management logic receives inputs from the inertial and air data systems to calculate the calculated AOA.
Has any one in this forum have access to B737 MAX AMM (Pages from AMM Chap 34-20-00) and if you can post the same system info for B737 MAX redudancy management of AOA signals.
I am just curious, and hope it does not bore other users.