Chopjock's view on the fuel system is supported; it is the responsibility of the manufacturer to provide a system that is resistant to mismanagement. Required pilot intervention during times of high activity should be engineered out of the solution - low fuel state appears to fall within this category.
That is particularly important as cockpits become more complex - for example with the introduction of integrated systems and automation. There is a need to engineer the system so that the pilot is presented with a conceptual model that is both simple and intuitive; as has been done with engine management.
However, the attempt to point a finger at the certification system is unwarranted. The 'Category A' requirement for the fuel system is as follows:
CS 29.953 Fuel system independence
(a) For Category A rotorcraft:
(1) The fuel system must meet the requirements of CS 29.903 (b); and
(2) Unless other provisions are made to meet sub-paragraph (a) (1) , the fuel system must allow fuel to be supplied to each engine through a system independent of those parts of each system supplying fuel to other engines.
The reference to 29.903(b) resolves as:
CS 29.903 Engines
(a) (Reserved)
(b) Category A; engine isolation. For each Category A rotorcraft, the powerplants must be arranged and isolated from each other to allow
operation, in at least one configuration, so that the failure or malfunction of any engine, or the failure of any system that can affect any engine, will not –
(1) Prevent the continued safe operation of the remaining engines; or
(2) Require immediate action, other than normal pilot action with primary flight controls, by any crew member to maintain safe operation.
Redundancy is pointless if the resulting 'system' is subject to a single point of failure.
JimL