Originally Posted by
Centaurus
How true that is. One 737 operator in Australia now requires their crews to select landing flap downwind because their pilots have difficulty flying a visual downwind and cannot guarantee to be stabilised for landing by 1000 ft. So the powers that be decide that if you can arrange to be stable and all landing checks completed before turning base, then in theory they should already be stable passing 1000 ft.
Unintended consequences can be that in such a case, the standard GPWS modes are reduced in effectiveness by being in the landing configuration. With the wonders of Don Batemans creativity, EGPWS still exists, but configuring early removes a layer of onion skin off of Shrek, as much as configuring and completing the checklist before turning base would. Circling approaches were fun, but they have had their time, and with RNP-AR Radius To Fix approach capabiity, there is really little justification for circling approaches anywhere. If anyone wants RNP-AR approaches sorted out, or ARA, or point in space approaches, GAS on the VIC/NSW border does very capable work in that area.
The commercial imperatives in a competitive market make it difficult for the airlines to justify spending the additional time for training that is above the minimum required to achieve compliance with an approved training matrix. Reinforcement training is great, when the issues are known, but most of the time we are placing bandaids on top of bandaids, making checklists include more items that can now get in the way of driving an aircraft. This is off topic, but then the topic was to raise the general question of training and comfprt of our flight crew going out into the wide world and slaying dragons on a daily basis. Aviation doesn't happen because of lift and drag, it happens because of confidence that people have in being able to go out and deal with the vagaries of operating in a complex dynamic environment.
Around 98% of all HF incidents involve loss of SA at some point in the process. Often, it is because the crew are busy dealing with compliance matters, (not always, but ti happens), and end up losing the plot. Our rules, regulations and procedures end up being blood based, and become a cascade of changes to the operator of the aircraft. Sometimes those changes are well thought out, and the change management processes really deal with risk analysis, sometimes they do not. The best solution is going to be well trained crews, who comprehend what the rules are, and why they are there. That is the same as a reasonable way to fly, knowing what you do, and why you do so. The upside of some knowledge about why is that when things go pear shaped, then the mismatch between what needs to occur, is recognised, S.A. Level 1, understood S.A. Level 2, and the implications of the problems can be comprehended promptly, S.A. Level 3, and defences implemented to maintain a safe operation.
Today, we do little in the way of S.A. training, which is a shame as it impacts all aspects of the operation, and can be conducted at very low levels of fidelity.
Cognitive loads on the flight crew impact S.A. and it's maintenance. The risk areas are identifiable in the funny pages, as well as the happy snaps such as the videos in this thread etc. The conditions we ask crews to fly in puts considerable load on the crew to make good decisions, and there are occasions that the crews would probably make different decisions if they could roll back the clock, and the passengers might just understand that.