Originally Posted by
mustafagander
I think, Leadie, that there was the "90 minute rule" in play. I was part of the team investigation the ramifications of this 90 minute rule for our QF ops. Very interesting!! The Johnson Island diversion scenario was an "interesting" hypothetical. Manus Island and Nadzab were equally "interesting".
Add Majuro, Biak and Zamboanga.
With the 90 minutes, the latter became quite important, and Qantas actually paid for and installed a backup power supply for the airport lights there, I often wondered if they would have worked, had we needed them. Or in whose backyard the backup power could be found.
I don't think any of us would have gone to Nadzab at night, instead of Moresby, unless it was a fire.
Johnson Island, very highly mega ultra top secret, we used to (only) half jokingly say that if we ever had to go there , they would have to shoot us. We were not supposed to know it was where all the US chemical weapons were dumped, for ultimate destruction. That was classified info. in Australia, and carefully hidden from the public in the pages of AW&ST in the US.
We actually routed a B767-238 via Majuro once,
PR/Goodwill as much as anything.
In many respects Air New Zealand and Qantas "pioneered" twin ER operations, UK CAA/JAA were anti, FAA sat on the fence ( with ridiculous multiple failure planning requirements -- that no 3/4 holer could meet) , European and US pilot unions were opposed (as was AFAP, but not AIPA) Airbus had the "new" A340 on the market, it was some years before they certified an ER version of the A310.
If my memory serves me correctly, three years after the first ER operations commenced, over 80% of ER sectors were QF and ANZ around the Pacific/SEA.
With the European concept of "long range" (Paris-Cairo "non-stop"), the A300 could never be called long range, was there ever an ER version certified??
As I said, in a previous post, such a project put to CASA in the present day would never get off the ground.
Tootle pip!!