Although it no longer directly affects me since I'm retired, shortly after the crash multiple commercial operators and the FAA came to us and wanted to know if this issue with the engine control software could possibly affect any of the Boeing commercial aircraft. I drafted up a stock response that basically said 'We can't answer that question because Airbus/EASA haven't provided sufficient information for us to understand the cause. Please come back when an accident report with the root cause is released'. Sounds like that's not going to happen - fortunately for my co-workers most people have pretty much forgotten about this one and are no longer asking the question.
I worked engine controls and FADEC software for the majority of my career. I was also an engine controls DER or the delegated equivalent of a DER for 28 years. I know a lot about engine controls and FADEC software.
If I put on my conspiracy hat for a minute, I suspect the root cause is clearly known and so embarrassing to Rolls, Airbus, and EASA that they are covering it up and it'll never be publicly released. A very basic requirement for 'modifiable' critical software is that it has to have failsafe protections incorporated. If the necessary data hasn't been loaded (or is invalid), you either prevent operation (i.e. the engine won't start, or if it starts won't go above idle), or you program default values that will allow safe (although not optimal) engine operation. Oh, and you put up a bunch of fault messages. FADEC software is level A flight critical, it's certified to the same level as FBW flight control s/w.
If I assume that the limited public information on the cause is remotely correct - basically that torque curves were not correctly loaded in the FADEC s/w on multiple engines - and the most basic protections to prevent unsafe operation were not in place - it means that NONE of the people responsible for certifying the FADEC software did their job (again, Rolls, Airbus, and EASA). Further, there was a catastrophic breakdown in Airbus QC to allow an aircraft to be released for first flight without the appropriate s/w loaded.
Approving FADEC software without the most basic of safety protections is unforgivable - those responsible should loose the jobs. IF that's what happened and it's being covered up, that's criminal - people responsible should go to jail...