Well the Mayday program dealing with the Atlantic Glider has been shown in Canada and the report made by skydriller on 27 September pretty much covers it. Some of the individuals that saw the program took offense to radio transmission language used by the pilots but I can only assume that with the research that went into the program they used tapes of radio transmissions and just scripted it for the pilot (actors). I may be wrong.
The depiction of the leak was not accurate but they could not gain access to a Trent-700 used by any airline so it seemed correct for non technical viewers
What I am about to say can be taken as rumor since this is a rumor network but I have it on good authority that it is true. This material was presented to the Mayday production team but it was after the production was already in the can so it was not used.
Skydriller indicated in his review that Airbus had blamed the pilots for what went wrong with this information coming from an AD written by Airbus Industrie but it has never been officially released. This AD wrote out in very specific language what actions must be taken by the pilots in the event of a severe fuel imbalance. It was broken down into different sections each dealing with a specific problem some reflecting leakage and others reflecting other problems. In every case before the pilots could take action they had to determine the location of the leak as the operation of the bypass valve would be different for each case. It was shown on the TV program that once the pilots suspected a leak they had to cabin crew try to see if they could detect a leak. They were unable to do so because even with flashlights they could not detect a leak at night. This same condition would exist in detecting a leak according to the unreleased AD. Airbus Industrie also modified the computer program to assist in the combating and detection of a severe leak.
Regarding the release of the official report, it has been complete for some time now. But the reason it has not been released is because the principals of the investigation are at each other’s throats relative to the language of the report and the assessment of blame for the actual leak. Each one is blaming the other. During the program an Air Transat manager indicated that in the exchange of parts mistakes were made and for that Air Transat received a very sever financial penalty. In the installation of the fuel tube the mechanic did not check for clearance between the fuel line and the hydraulic tube. Under normal conditions this critical clearance would be automatic if the lines were installed correctly. However, the fuel line was installed backwards and in doing so the spatial relationship between the two metal lines was compromised.
Herein lies the problem. During the design phase of any complex machine the Reliability engineer will create a checklist and submit it to engineering in order to vet their designs relative to Reliability, Maintainability, and Systems Safety. One of the key requirements of the checklist is to determine if it is possible to install a part backwards. On way to do it for a metal tube is to have different fittings at each end. Another aspect of the checklist is to determine if parts can contact each other and what means are taken to prevent this contact. It would appear that if such a checklist was created it was never adhered to.
On the A-330 it was determined that on those aircraft using the GE or P&W engines there was a possibility of tubing contacting and a very small fuel leak ensued. An AD was released that established a specific clearance between the offending tubes and instructions were provided as to how to both establish and maintain that critical dimension. Airbus obviously never made sure that a similar problem would not occur on the Rolls-Royce Trent 700 used on the A-330.
After the A-330 had made the landing it was inspected but it was not revealed as to what actually had transpired. A day or so later a rep from either Rolls Royce or Airbus Industrie showed up with a replacement for the damage fuel line. Nobody knew what had failed but the carrier of the replacement tube obviously knew that this part had failed and either Rolls Royce or Airbus had surmised what had transpired because they knew of the possibility of the leak occurring.
To top all of this off Air Transat took delivery of a brand new A-330 and when inspected it was found that at least one of the fuel tubes had been installed backwards.
