Originally Posted by
AndySmith
Of course, this theory is completely irrelevant if faced with a nuclear-powered boat - which was something the Argentine Navy was having to rapidly adapt its tactics to deal with.... as explained in Mariano's book.
It’s not a “theory”, it is a mathematical technique used to produce a solution to a problem. It’s in exactly the same category as the procedures used to calculate a Critical Point or a Point of No Return or a Time Late at Datum calculation. You put the numbers in you get an answer, use different numbers you get a different answer. The information provided was in response to a post regarding a specific event. The threat was a conventional submarine not a nuclear powered boat.
You can still construct a Limiting Lines diagram for a submarine with performance characteristics of a SSN but quite clearly the Limiting Lines becomes threat lines outside of which the submarine would be unable to gain position to launch an attack. You may wish to consider the situation with a high speed surface unit; submarine has only a small or low speed advantage; and a weapon similar to the Mk8 torpedo. Manoeuvring after detection, based upon Limiting Lines could still negate the attacker’s firing solution.
The problem facing the Argentinians wasn’t just one of relative speed but an almost complete lack of acoustic information about potential attackers. No source level information, no signature information, not even any discrete lines. You get something print out on the AQA5 in a Tracker, how are they going to determine whether or not it might be a target related line?
ASW may be an “art” and does sometimes benefit from apparent luck. But it’s usually because one party knows the techniques and procedures very thoroughly and knows how to apply them and maybe the other party makes an error. RN warfare officers learnt the former on the Maritime Operations Course and later in their career would hone their decision making on the a Maritime Tactical Course. Maybe they still do.
YS