Sycamore
The Assistant Chief of the Air Staff signs the RTS. The SI gets seriously mixed up in this area, saying the RTS used to be called the Military Aircraft Release. The first time it didn't matter. The second time it did, because it was trying to make sense of responsibilities and got it wrong.
Apart from ShyTorque's observations, what struck me most was the structural integrity discussion. The Panel seemed impressed that structural integrity was managed 'as far back as 1998'. I really think these Panels should be told to read the evidence to the Nimrod Review, at least. Prior to 1992 there was both a Fixed and Rotary Wing Structural Integrity Working Party; the latter chaired by Director Helicopter Projects. These were two of the four major committees that reported to the Defence Airworthiness Group. But then Rotary started doing its own thing, formed the Helicopter Airworthiness Management Group and structural integrity merely became a line item on the agenda. You can do this at a lower level on individual types, but it is a false economy when considering the entire rotary fleet. This background may have helped the Panel explain a few things; such as why the project team was non-complaint on structural integrity, risk recording and ageing aircraft audits, and major risks not tolerable and ALARP.
There's a one-liner (1.4.145) about both Bell and MoD declining to fund research into fatigue. I'd have liked to see a deeper discussion of this. I know what Bell would say, but what was MoD's reason? 'Affordability' is not a valid reason. 'Cost' doesn't explain why the task just didn't proceed. Did someone sign-off to say the risk had now reduced somehow?
A pretty good report, but all very familiar.