A basic part of risk management is to assess the magnitude of the risk. Then an appropriate defence can be determined. It sounds savage, but the events of Sep 11 in 2001, when compared to the number of flights and passengers that had been safely carried even in that one year, was statistically insignificant. The chance of any airplane, or any passenger on that airplane, being subject to a terrorism incident, even if the authorities did nothing to protect against it, is so small that it could be ignored. Of course that is not a sound approach, even if the only aim is to reassure the travelling public, but it is easy to over-react, and when the real aim (as I believe it is) is to grow an empire, overreaction is logical.
A bomb threat makes sense only if the perpetrator intends mischief, to disrupt the target and cause panic and expense. If the aim is to simply blow the target apart, then a warning makes no sense at all. The example of the IRA attacking Heathrow was a different scenario, involving an act of war, and there were several warnings (false warnings) before the mortar attack. With respect, it was not a bomb threat as is commonly considered. The bombing of Pan Am (and others) did not start with a warning (an actual threat to that airplane, flight or even airline). There were general threats, but nobody called in to say that they intended to attack that flight. The bombers gave no warning. It is still true that a bomb threat has always meant that there was no bomb, real or fake. It would be possible to ignore all threats, and react to only genuine explosions or actual bombs. The saving in time and money would be very real. After all the years of telling the public that only the government can protect them though, would make such an approach a political disaster.
So what can be done to provide a reasonable level of protection without driving the public away from the airports and destroying the airline industry, as is being done now? First, we need to go back to a reasonable level of surveillance, tighter than it was before Sep 11, but not as draconian as we see today. Second, stop the random searches and quota searches. These waste resources. Better to put the effort into what will work. Lay off the nailfiles, laptops and shoes. Third, develop effective profiling, to identify those who are likely to be terrorists and criminals. There are some airlines and airports that have this skill and could be a source for worthwhile training. Ignoring “foreign” ideas as “not invented here” is simply stupid and plays into the hands of the terrorists.
Fourth, clear all the baggage X-ray machines away from public concourses. Put them out back, where the detonation of a bomb will hurt fewer people.
Fifth, develop procedures and training for flight and cabin crew to be able to handle inflight terrorism and criminal acts. Sort out the legal liabilities for them and see that they have the right tools to get the job done. After all, when the airport security fails (as it has, and as it will) it is in the air that the real danger must be faced. Make sure that all crew know that under no circumstances will anyone be allowed access to the flight deck. Never; no matter what. The flight deck crew should, on the receipt of a threat, have a way to manually lock the door (if fitted), prepare for an attack (using guns or other means) and immediately land the airplane. Cabin crew must be aware that they are on their own, and not to expect help from the flight deck. Many of you think that this is already procedure, but until it is officially FAA/CAA mandated it is not.
Sixth, expedite the training and provision of guns (or other weapons) for pilots and armed marshals.
There are other ways to improve safety in the air, but somehow those of us who actually fly on the airplanes are hardly ever asked for our opinion. Meanwhile the empires grow.