Great to have
Centaurus back in the discussion. IIRC he's the only poster with CV-340 pilot experience on the thread.
Originally Posted by
Centaurus
...Photos accompanying the official report prove beyond doubt the accident aircraft departed with the top and bottom cowl flaps fully open. See above previous highlighted comment. The photo shows a fire that can be seen through the open top cowl flap. Is it possible that the intensity of the fire could be made worse by the airflow through the open cowl flap?
The drag would be significant. I was a QFI on the RAAF Convair 440 Metropolitan based at Canberra in the 1960's era. As far as I recall it was unheard of to take off with the cowl flaps fully open.
...if my memory serves me correctly, for take off we selected the cowl flaps selector switches to a position called "Trail" or similar name and the cowl flaps would then close to a position about two inches open. This gave minimum drag commensurate with keeping the CHT within take off limits.
Yes, "TRAIL" is also used for take-off on the C-47 with its R1830 (Twin Wasp) engines, and now see selector panel in post by
uncle8 above.
Originally Posted by
Centaurus
The report states the propeller of the engine on fire was not feathered; indeed the fire drill was not actioned either. At impact, evidence indicated the engine was delivering very little power. It is no wonder the aircraft was unable to maintain height on one engine given the high density altitude, the drag from a windmilling propeller and the fully open cowl flaps on the engine.
.
As I posted in
my first reaction to the report,
"The report suggests that the L/H propellor was receiving much less power and/or rotating slower than the R/H at impact, but that no shut down had been performed by the crew. In the absence of any explanation, it seems incredible that, faced with a failure and fire on the L/H engine and an accompanying loss of climb performance, the captain would wish to keep it running."
Originally Posted by
Centaurus
The single manifold pressure gauge with twin needles marked 1 and 2 and the single RPM gauge with its twin needles marked 1 and 2 which were on the Convair 340 and 440, could be a bit of a trap for the unwary. [...] The South African report reveals there was initial uncertainty among crew members which engine was the problem. With the single manifold pressure and single RPM gauge design, I can understand that.
Indeed, showing a critical parameter for two engines on a single gauge is an ergonomic nightmare although - from his position behind the pilots, and with only the engines to handle - the LAME was in a good position dispassionately to interpret the gauges. OTOH, unlike the PF, he would not know how much yaw (if any) was accompanying the engine problem, i.e., how much rudder/control-wheel was being applied, and the forces needed to do it.
Originally Posted by
Centaurus
The report stated the LAME was handling the engine controls. That is another trap IMHO. Too many cooks spoiling the broth, as the saying goes. I saw this happen once. [...]
[...] Afterwards I pondered this situation and came to the conclusion there were too many hands on the flight deck sharing simple tasks and if there were already two pilots in a two crew aircraft it was superfluous to have someone else, no matter how qualified, reaching between them operating engine controls.
Yes, although I don't need to remind you that all large and long-haul aircraft employed a flight engineer to mind the engines and most other systems from the 1940s to the early-1980s, culminating in the L-1011, DC-10 and B747 Classic. And, of course, the Airbus A300B. When Airbus redesigned and automated the A300 cockpit and introduced the glass-cockpit A310 and A300-600 - with all systems-switches within reach of both pilots - the design was euphemistically referred to as the forward-facing crew cockpit. Airbus really meant it was a two-pilot cockpit, but was trying not to antagonise the flight-engineers' unions. So Air France introduced the A310 with two pilots and a forward-facing F/E. That didn't last long, and meanwhile Boeing had introduced the two-pilot B767. When any member of a cockpit crew is relegated to a monitoring role, (s)he loses motivation and can even be a liability in an emergency.
In this case, it's possible that the captain had tacitly delegated any decision-making process on engine handling to the experienced LAME, who regarded the aircraft as his baby. The LAME, on the other hand, may have been waiting simply for the captain to call for the engine fire drill. This, and a lack of communication, could have led to a mutual paralysis in decision-making and nothing was done. Very soon after, both pilots became preoccupied with trying to maintain control of the aircraft.
This preliminary report, as previously stated by me and others, contains minor anomalies. More significantly, there is no mention of fuel analysis. Perhaps that will follow.