At face value, there was an engine failure and fire leading to an RTO and evacuation, and nobody died. "Nothing to see here..." However, if you follow the ARMS methodology, this could easily have escalated into a catastrophic outcome (major loss of life and/or hull loss).
Several slides were rendered useless by crew actions or the effects of fire, but there was sufficient redundancy for a successful evac, aided by a 55% load factor. All good news, but there is no doubt that the barriers had been eroded. What might have been the result for a full pax load? Or a bigger fire?
For me, this opens the debate again on having initial evacuation actions as a memory item. There are arguments to be had for and against, and it might not be appropriate for all types, but it does need a reasoned discussion rather than the usual PPrune/Donald Trump game of playing the man rather than the ball. And if, say, slotting the engines and fuel masters as an immediate action causes other problems on a particular type (depressurisation etc), then those are the issues that need feeding into future design considerations and certification standards.
The second issue that is worth further thought is that, at least in in lighter winds, a 5-7kt crosswind appears to be the perfect scenario for directing upwind engine-associated fires against the hull (as with the Manchester accident). So is the 'stop in a straight line' SOP for some wide-body operators sensible or is it worth revisiting in light of the G-VIIO experience?
NB, these are questions, not answers!