Originally Posted by
212man
Where do you see that? I looked and can only see reference to it be one of the options to be looked at and the quickly ruled out as they shown to be correctly mounted at the time of the break up.
Page 143 of the report..
"2.8.6.2 Despite the intentions of the G-REDL test program and the safety measures introduced to improve the chip detection system, the AIBN finds that the actions undertaken by Airbus Helicopters following the G-REDL accident could have been more effective with regards to a possible scenario with limited spalling, assessing the effectiveness of the detection system and reviewing the MGB design features. The AIBN also finds that the oversight of Airbus Helicopters by EASA could have been more effective with regards to implementation of the safety recommendations and the follow-up on the information from the G-REDL accident report. In summary, Airbus Helicopters and EASA did not successfully manage to realise the safety potential from the G-REDL accident report."
and
"2.13.1.3 The AIBN understands EASA’s obligation to follow its procedures as a public administrative body. However, the AIBN had to wait for two to six months before receiving some of the documents from EASA and consequently this influenced the progress of the investigation."
further
"2.14.1.2 Further, it is essential for the AIBN to assess the safety actions already taken following this accident in order to issue relevant safety recommendations. In addition, this investigation has been affected by the grounding of the AS 332 L2 and the EC 225 LP helicopters and the subsequent effort by Airbus Helicopters and the regulators concerning the return to service (RTS) (see Appendix F). During this process, important information related to the return to service was delayed or not disclosed to the AIBN."
and
"2.14.2.3 On 7 October 2016, EASA lifted the flight prohibition based on the RTS actions put in place by Airbus Helicopters. According to EASA, the mandated RTS actions ensured airworthiness was restored at an acceptable level of safety in accordance with Part 21 and EASA procedures. Furthermore, the CARI was developed to make further improvements (see Appendix F to the report).
2.14.2.4 The investigation was ongoing with important aspects still open. The AIBN understands EASA’s role and Airbus Helicopters’ position, but would have expected a more precautionary approach at the time, since the accident involved a critical part in which failure has led to two catastrophic events. The national bans on flying in Norway and UK imposed by the CAAs remained in place."
In this section and paragraphs of the report it becomes pretty clear that more should have been done by both Airbus and EASA.