When the 767 was retired, there was an initial intention to place all of the surplus crew from the 767 onto the A330 in rank. No demotions, conversions only to promote again two years later, another conversion. Hold a surplus on the 330 in the short term knowing the tsunami of training we’re seeing now was just around the corner. It was obvious to anyone with their eyes open. This simple act would have saved a vast percentage of the training problem. Did it happen? Of course not. All of the 767 crew myself included, have now been through a demotion, a conversion course (380 in my case), three years atrophied, a conversion (787) and subsequent promotion. It’s like an episode of Keystone Cops.
Of course not.
The intent has been industrial. The attempt in 2011 to drive the pilot body to arbitration had upside risk for them that they would get what they wanted; a substantially watered down agreement The downside risk was the Bench left the agreement as it was.
Industrially the umpire chose more the latter (reading the summary findings) There were far more cost effective remedies to a short term pilot surplus than demotion. However the intent was to render control on unit cost and contain wage pressure.
All of their activity is predicated toward lowering unit cost. As admirable as that may be, they are the ignorant refuse you refer to.
They did not notice a building demographic shortage, nor do they appear to notice the rising oil price. Qantas has shocking fleet metrics and this could also be exposed by rising fuel prices.
One may postulate though that having no pilots and cancelling a lot of flights might reduce the fuel bill by a lot! /sarc
I feel a headache coming on. Might even prevent my next pattern.
The apparatus of HR is well equipped to control a work force that transgresses, however it is ill equipped to deal with passive resistance.
Jokes aside, Qantas need a new fleet.