The first step is to understand what the future requirement will be. He lies the problem with the fluctuating state of the world and political whim.
The timescale required to develop, design, build, and test modern systems is now so long it negates most plans. Hence the reluctance of any single manufacturer to commit to a ‘dated’ requirement, preferring to spread the cost of inevitable change (blame) amongst several countries.
One approach is to design multi-role aircraft; but nowadays it is the expected roles which are ill defined / uncertain. Another approach is to address the national and manufacturing need by managing these uncertainties by having ‘role flexible’ aircraft, but again what does that consist of in the absence of defined roles.
Both have been tried with varying success, but an emergent strategy is to adapt what already exists. F15, F16, F18, are conventionally ‘old’, - 1974’sh prototypes, yet are still capable for most current needs after modification. History might identify as error the demise of the Tornado; why don’t we build on success - do we recognise successful adaptation when we achieve it. cf A10.
Does the U.K. have a flexible, adaptable manned aircraft for the future in the Typhoon; make it stealthy if required, integrate electronics, etc. The Lightning II debate is elsewhere, but starting with stealth and trying to adapt that might reduce the original capability.
Back to the super Hawk or RPV, to support international intervention; a ‘battleship’ armed AEW / surveillance / anti sub for the more consistent defensive role, yet how many of these tasks could be undertaken by RPV, and what are the development capabilities / timescales for RPV. Fewer platforms, but with a greater range of sensors and weapons.
Perhaps this why the manufacturers have a healthy focus on RPV; adaptable for the home market and sufficient flexible - cost effective, for overseas sales, and more resilient in accommodating world and political change.