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Old 24th Jun 2018, 11:49
  #48 (permalink)  
AVR4000
 
Join Date: Jul 2007
Location: Sweden
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Originally Posted by mickjoebill
At the pull and twist of a handle, the worlds most tested computers can’t be trusted to “make safe” an aircraft for evacuation, once it’s come to a stop?

mjb
It doesn't work that way since such a system would have to perform a couple of things:

1. Set parking brake.
2. Shut down the remaining engine(s).
3. Close the fuel supply to the engines.
4. Operate the fire suppression system if needed (such as when fire warning is still on after the first shot have been fired into the engine).
5. Depressurize the cabin.

The next question is when this system should kick into action? Is it when an engine failure is detected (a failure would be defined as sudden rpm drop, loss of thrust, reduced burner pressure, overheating, fire indication etc)? It must be able to distinguish between an "engine failure" and a "catastrophic fuel-fed fire" since the need to evacuate arise in the latter case but not the former.

The question is how the system can determine a fuel leak and a fire caused by it unless a sophisticated set of sensors paired with a computer system can figure out that "X amount of fuel is flowing but the engine is shut down" or "the amount of fuel pumped out of the tank is higher than the amount of fuel received on the engine end". I.e. the fuel is flowing at a normal rate from the tank but the engine failure caused the line to separate so it is flowing out on the tarmac rather than into the right place.

An over-automated aircraft relying on artificial intelligence (i.e. the decision-making is now transferred to the machine itself and different systems operate in specific ways on different events) would be less safe since the automation would require very exact, reliable input from multiple sources in order to make appropriate decisions such as shutting down engines immediately when the speed hits 0 after an abandoned take-off.

Even a manual "evacuation switch" that shuts down the engines, close the fuel-supply, depressurizes the cabin and everything would require pretty complex co-operation across different systems without adding any particular benefit but rather increase risks if something doesn't work in the process.

The normal evacuation checklists are OK, the thing is to convey information to the crew so they can make a quick, informed decision whether an evacuation is necessary or not.
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