Originally Posted by
wiggy
I’ve been a ‘Trainer”, but not with my current outfit..
Don’t think I’ve ever read an accident report ever, regardless of Airline/operator were there has been nil criticism /observations of the crew actions...and I include some of the high profile “hero status” accidents...
In the LAS case I don’t think anyone (inside or outside BA) has ever claimed the evacuation checklist was actioned in an optimal manner....
Comparing incidents on the line with sim performance and timings - Sim performance is the “ ideal”, and it darn ought to be good, after all you know it’s coming somewhere during the recurrent..... in the real world plug into the mix startle factor, touch of fatigue/midnight on the body clock, less than forthcoming comms from external observer (cf. AVR4000’s excellent post about the crews mindset initially and the subsequent need to change it.) there’s scope for erosion..there’s something about plans of campaign not surviving first contact with the enemy that might be appropriate...
I think all videos of this event including the in-cabin ones where the "All passengers, please remain seated" shows a crew that try to assess the situation. They knew they had an engine failure and yes, a fire warning came on after a few seconds but they had no idea due to a lack of information that there were a fuel leak and severe fire between the fuselage and engine 1.
The lack of ATC information also made it "less urgent". My own mindset would be like:
"OK, we have an engine failure, fire warning came on but we did the suppression already and NO INFORMATION from ATC when we stopped either so it's a failure and we will taxi clear of the runway in a few minutes so engine 2 can be kept running."
The lack of an ATC call would certainly give the impression that NO FIRE could be seen. It is reasonable for a crew to expect a call about visible flames if there are any, either from ATC as a reply to their "stopping" message or by other aircraft in the vicinity or a combination. This crew acted pretty much the way it could be expected from a lack of appropriate information, i.e. "keep the engine running for taxi, assess the situation and taxi clear of the runway when things are checked".
It could even have been that way that the crew did decided to taxi clear of the runway before stopping due to their mindset under the circumstances (lack of radio calls about fire could very well produced a mindset of getting clear, especially if a taxiway were in a convenient location as they slowed down).
The focus should be on providing pilots with tools for situational assessment, i.e. the ability to know the environment outside the aircraft and make appropriate decisions based on such knowledge. It is pretty natural to consider "taxi clear" or even "taxi to gate" after an engine failure, both due to the risks of evacuation but also for passenger comfort.
Evacuation can't be the "supposed default action" just because of an engine failure, i.e. that the absolute first thing that should be done is the evacuation checklist immediately after stopping on the runway without any other information than "engine failure, fire warning came on a few seconds later".
A camera located in front of the nose gear (showing the landing gear and engines) and another one on the tail (showing the engines, wings and top of the fuselage) would provide all information needed, right away. The most appropriate course of action would be:
1. Engine failure or fire - throttle to idle, fuel cutoff, ignition off, fire handle pull
2. Assess situation (using the camera system and other sources such as ATC)
3. If serious fire: Evacuation checklist, shut down remaining engines
4. If minor failure: Keep other engine running, taxi clear of the runway when appropriate
If step 1 and 2 happens at the same time (i.e. the crew knows about the fire already while they are braking) - evacuation checklist immediately when the aircraft comes to a complete stop.
I can't blame the BA2276 crew for their attempts to assess the situation rather than just ordering evacuation when they had no idea about the conditions (it is pretty evident that their first clue were the visible smoke rising above the fuselage and it took a while before it happened since the plume was dynamic during braking and the major development started after they had stopped, this is also visible on the in-cabin video). It shows the aircraft accelerating normally, suddenly it shudders heavily but nothing particular is seen first, they stop and after a couple of seconds black smoke rises in front of the wing and the callout "Ladies and gentlemen, please remain seated" can be heard.
The crew couldn't see anything particularly amiss until the smoke become visible and the lack of ATC information certainly did slow them down.
Even the American 383 did show a bit of the mindset issue when the number 1 was running when the doors opened (seems like the pilots also thought about taxiing clear of the runway). It is very audible that the engine is idling when the first passengers went out of the L1 door before it spools down and stops.
It is appropriate to arrange ways for a crew to get the information needed to do a prompt evacuation decision when needed.
There is another video of BA2276 commencing take-off where the engine failure can be seen and it doesn't look dramatic at first; it is possible to see smoke being emitted but the aircraft slows down and stops without something that would indicate the need for immediate evacuation. The fierce fire became visible after stopping when the plume became static and the fuel started to flow onto the runway.
Edit: It is pretty interesting to notice that even when they called "Speedbird 2276, mayday, mayday, request fire services" - there was still no information from the ATC regarding fire despite the smoke now being way more serious. When they made their mayday call a decent exchange of information would have been: "Speedbird 2276, fire services are on their way, there's a lot of smoke on the left side of your aircraft".
If I would see an aircraft on fire like that I would certainly call the crew and report it, especially when it is pretty evident from the lack of evacuation AND one engine still running that they don't really understand the situation.
It is almost painful to hear the lack of fire communication from ATC in this case, it is like crew were "expected" to figure everything out on their own. It is pretty clear that ATC saw what's happened since they started to issue go-around commands and closed the runway but not a single word about the fire being serious.
Since the fire was located between the engine and fuselage, such information is important since looking out of the flight deck windows would produce a "normal" view of the wing, without anything amiss.