The NTSB report into the engine fire at Las Vegas in 2015 has now been released. The reasons for the fire are pretty routine and remedies have already been implemented.
However the report does go on to criticize the actions of the Captain during the evacuation, which doesn't make for good reading either for the Captain or BA's training system.
While the airplane was decelerating to a stop, the fire warning bell sounded. When the airplane came to stop, the captain called for the engine fire checklist. The third item on the checklist was to move the fuel control switch on the affected side (in this case, the left side) to the cutoff position, which shuts down the respective engine. The spar valve terminates fuel flow to an engine after it is shut down. Flight data recorder (FDR) data showed that about 28 seconds elapsed between the start of the engine failure and the time of the spar valve closure, and Boeing estimated that about 97 gallons of fuel had spilled onto the runway during this time. FDR data also showed that 22 seconds elapsed between the time that the captain initially called for the engine fire checklist and the time of the spar valve closure. (Thirteen seconds had elapsed between the time that the captain repeated his call for the engine fire checklist and the time of the spar valve closure.) If the left engine had been shut down sooner, there would have been less fuel on the runway to feed the fire.
The captain commanded the evacuation (step three in the evacuation checklist) before calling for the evacuation checklist and performing the first two steps in the checklist. Step two of the evacuation checklist instructs the captain to shut down both engines. The left engine was shut down as part of the engine fire checklist, but the right engine continued operating for about 43 seconds after the captain's evacuation command. The unusual attitude of two slides (the 3R and 4R slides) resulted from the jet blast coming from the right engine while it was operating.
The captain did not use the QRH to read and do his evacuation checklist items. The right engine was shut down after the relief pilot noticed EICAS indications showing that the engine was still running. Also, the captain's call for the evacuation checklist occurred after the relief pilot stated that the checklist needed to be performed. (The first officer had stated, just before the relief pilot, "we haven't done the engine checklist," but he most likely meant the evacuation checklist.) Because the captain did not follow standard procedures, his call for the evacuation checklist and the shutdown of the right engine were delayed.
Full report available at
www.ntsb.gov