https://publications.parliament.uk/p...dTextAnchor043
68.We have recently reported on the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter programme.
147 In that report, we accepted assurances from the MoD and from the manufacturer Lockheed Martin that a number of reported developmental problems were being addressed and we look forward to being kept updated on them.
We reiterate our view that the MoD’s refusal to disclose cost estimates for the F-35 to Parliament is unacceptable and risks undermining public confidence in the programme. As well as providing greater clarity on this matter,
the Department should also use the MDP as an opportunity to make clear whether it remains its policy to buy the intended complement of 138 aircraft and what mix of variants it now envisages purchasing for the remainder.148
69.A key component of anti-submarine warfare (ASW) operations, mentioned above in the maritime section, is the airborne ASW capability delivered by maritime patrol aircraft (MPA). The UK is re-establishing its long-range MPA capability with the purchase of nine Boeing P-8A Poseidon aircraft from the United States. We have received detailed written evidence from former RAF officers with extensive experience of ASW operations who argue that
the intended aircraft and crew provision for the MPA force is too low to fulfil the range of tasks under its responsibility. Unrealistic assumptions have been made about the ability of NATO allies to contribute to MPA provision and that at least 16 aircraft and a higher crewing requirement is needed to attain the necessary coverage.
149
70.
The UK has no substantial missile defence capability.
150 The 2015 SDSR recognised the threat from state and non-state actors acquiring increasingly sophisticated missile technology. Commitments were made to invest in a ground-based ballistic missile defence (BMD) radar system to enhance NATO’s BMD Network, and to investigate the potential of Type 45 destroyers taking on a BMD role.
151 Answers to written questions
152 have indicated that these capabilities are still in their early developmental stages. The Department should make clear in the MDP its proposed way forward on BMD, including on both radars and potential interceptors, whether in a UK or combined NATO context. In addition, the Department should consider how it will address the need for point defence—including against cruise missiles—at key installations in the UK, not least the principal RAF airbases
71.
The Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) capability provided by the RAF’s E-3D Sentry fleet has been allowed to decline. The 2015 SDSR committed the RAF to keeping the fleet in service until 2035,
153 but the E-3D aircraft are no longer maintained and upgraded to the required avionics standards, and flying hours in recent years have been substantially reduced. AWACS provide airborne surveillance and battle management capability over extended range, crucial in a complex airspace contested by peer adversaries. Recent reports indicate that a replacement for Sentry is being considered as part of the MDP.
154 The full range of available options including (but not confined to) an upgrade of the E-3D Sentry aircraft, should be considered by the RAF to restore its AWACS capability.
72.
The ability of aircraft to penetrate sophisticated enemy air defence systems must be addressed. The RAF’s principal anti-radar
suppression of enemy air defence (SEAD) weapon, designed to target and neutralise enemy air defence systems, was abandoned in 2013.
155 The advanced capability of the F-35 may compensate for this, but the safety of the non-stealth aircraft also still in service—such as Typhoon—must also be considered.