Megan,
The EASA paper feature that I find most interesting (and I haven't read all the references) is that it assumes that FFR is part of normal reserves, which is NOT the concept behind the FFR. Other posts have covered the concept ---- that it is to cover vagaries of Order of Accuracy and to ensure that there is something left, so that the engine(s) are running.
Indeed, initially, after a number of near exhaustion incidents, Boeing published a table of "minimum fuel for approach", which Boeing defined as "that amount of fuel, calculated or indicated, below which BCA Inc. will not guarantee the successful completion of the approach", and defined approach as "on final at 1500 and in the landing configuration".
It was not necessarily related to any non-normal operation.
A number of airlines operating Boeing aircraft, including BOAC and QF, took a different tack, as a result of the Boeing "recommendation", and fuel policies at the time were amended to what later became codified as FFR, and "minimum fuel at the end of the landing roll" made its appearance ----- many years before any ICAO action. Indeed, in at least two airlines, "minimum fuel at the end of the landing role" featured in Instructions to Captains, quite distinct to fuel policy, ie: wherever you finally wound up, have 30 minutes in tanks ---- so that the engined are still running.
As far as I have read, the EASA paper does not acknowledge this original history, but I must read further.
Sunfish,
CASA completely refuses to do the kind of statistical analysis in the EASA paper, let alone benefit/cost analysis depicted, likewise Airservices.
Tootle pip!!
PS: I did apologise for my original remarks about Nandi. What I was alluding was the fact that PanAm/United would buck the winter jetstreams on KLAX-YSSY routes much further south than we would fly on the same day.
When flying N- registered aeroplanes I always found the FAA mandated dispatch system and flight following a bleeding nuisance.
Last edited by LeadSled; 17th Jun 2018 at 08:24.