Steve, #265, somewhat harsh and narrow ‘thoughts’. The TSB made the best of what they had as enabled by other agencies.
A lot has been said about monitoring, but monitoring what and how. No precision guidance, visual only, with references of dubious quality, but as enabled by ICAO, the Regulator, or the Operator.
RNAV / GPS were widely promoted as ‘Precision-Like’ approaches, yet may be no better than most NPAs. Do these present an illusion of accuracy?
Who previously thought about deteriorating visibility over the sea.
Nose down pitch, equally likely due to an illusion due to reducing visual range in heavy rain where crews try to maintain the same slant visual range, but lacking the ground features to help combat it.
A habit of ‘ducking under’ at this airport; instruments were as expected.
Investigations and reports such as this cannot be expected to provide a complete explanation for human behaviour in the circumstances as presented.
Instead of requiring ‘findings as to risk’ or explanation, we must consider what has been published, and thus what we might learn, individually and collectively.
The actual cause of this accident should be of no consequence to our safety thoughts and actions.
Future safety depends on what we do, what we learn from the event; not what was wrong with reporting or in operations.
First how might the situation be avoided, then what help can be provided for the crew, especially for them to mitigate any unforeseen circumstances.
There may be as many views of what can be learnt as there are posts, but which are of greater value and most likely to be implemented.