To be fair, the DOT&E reports are statements of where the programme is against its baseline T&E schedule. They are always factually correct -they have to be - if often interpreted by some as the end of the world, rather than test schedule not being maintained. There's a difference between that and a report that seems to wilfully ignore or misinterpret the written transcript of evidence to paint a picture of chaos - which would appear to be stretching the truth somewhat - that could only be fixed by the often impractical recommendations of the committee.
Part of the reason some of the long-term capability programmes take so long to deliver is that they are subject to endless navel-gazing and governance scrutiny, compliance with which sometimes overtakes delivery as a goal. It is ironic that process instituted to ensure good VFM, can sometimes have the exact opposite effect. That's not to excuse incompetence by the way, just to highlight the effect that short-term control measures (eg ABC) can actually be deleterious to the objective. The evidence transcript on Dreadnought regarding the budget profiling is a good case in point - it's not the total spend amount that is a risk, but the spend profile in early years.