Originally Posted by
KenV
The "negotiations" were a farce because the Iranians were not engaged in negotiation but deception, and the resulting deal is an equal farce.
Is that why the anti-American hardliners hated it so much and why they celebrated today? They seem to be a weird bunch.
Knowing what we know now we can and should negotiate a much tougher deal
Please. It took years and years the last time and the people involved were actually semi qualified. Also, explain me the strength of the US' negotiating position when even its staunchest allies don't agree with it and are actively keeping the old, terrible, deal alive? How do you see that working, precisely?
The old end result gave Iran unlimited unfettered ability to do whatever they wanted after the agreement expired, which begins in phases in 2023.
From the document I linked to:
Under the agreement the IAEA will have access to all of Iran’s nuclear facilities for the
next 20 years. It will continuously monitor the country’s enrichment capability, including
through real-time monitoring of its enrichment facilities and access to its uranium mining
and milling facilities. The IAEA will also supervise the production of uranium concentrate
(“yellow cake”) for the next 25 years. The IAEA seals on disassembled and stored centrifuges
will notify the Agency if they are tampered with. Iran must allow short-notice inspections
of its nuclear facilities – as short as two hours if inspectors are already present at the site.
The JCPOA also outlines a mechanism for gaining access to sites of concern, for example, if there is suspicious activity at an undeclared site. Iran can challenge the IAEA
’s request to inspect the facility, leading to an arbitration process that could take up to 24 days to
resolve.
This provision is intended to close a loophole in the Additional Protocol, which
does not cover what the international community can do if a country refuses to grant
the IAEA access to a suspect facility within 24 hours. While Iran could potentially use that
timeline to hide some evidence of minor illicit activities, the facilities needed to develop
a covert nuclear programme are likely to leave traces of radiation that do not disappear
quickly. In other words, illicit activity at an undeclared site is likely to be detected under the
JCPOA. If Iran decided to “sneak out” it would have to rebuild an entire covert fuel cycle, from
uranium ore to weapons-usable uranium, but it cannot do so and escape detection. Iran is
unable to produce all the parts and components necessary for its programme indigenously.
As a result, it would have either to procure what it needs or divert materials from
authorized procurements. Diversion would likely be detected by the IAEA because of the
intrusive verification system put in place, combined with the existing export control
regimes
The new end result must ensure Iran can NEVER produce nuclear weapons.
At this point I'd be starting to feel safer if the US didn't have any, either.