re differences and training for differing 737 types
it is pretty well known & documented that the BMA 1988 Kegworth crash skipper transitioning from the newish 737-300 (still a fairly new type for BMA and for him since he had been on clockwork DC-9's for 10 years) to the latest brand spanking new 737-400, conclusions are that he had not been trained properly to identify that the new 734 glass cockpit engine vibration indicator readings (which were 2 tiny round dials with only white 0-5 idents and no yellow/red condition or range markers and was placed secondary panel quite low down on or to the side of the centre panel almost obscured by the gear handle or throttles - I cannot recall which sorry ) was in fact a primary instrument to adhere to.
His failure was not to notice and identify that the LH engine VIB IND was reading 9 (max) and the RH engine was reading 0 zero.
Had his training on this and other identifiers been more thorough, especially as he had over 20 years on analogue aircraft he would have there and then correctly identified the bad engine that had thrown a blade.
The subsequent crash was caused by inadvertent shutting down of the good RH engine and would not have occurred.
The pilots were criticised for reacting prematurely and contrary to their training. However, the AAIB report also raised questions and 31 recommendations including about the design and placing of the flight deck instruments, training, and other contributory factors such as fan blade fatigue due non-flight tested for the new higher powered engines and cabin crew interaction.
As an aside:
We know had the cabin crew contacted the cockpit crew to inform them the LH engine was actually on fire (having head Capt's PA that the RH engine being shut down) then again the crash would not have occurred, but at that time such communications was not part of a flight deck and cabin crew management requirement.
When BY/BAL/TOM based at LTN and AMM/FCA based at MAN merged the flight training and SOP's for the new big Company these were cherry picked from both airlines but I gather a lean towards the MAN operation and SOP's was taken, yet strangely the LTN operation was much larger and had had many more years experience since 1964 - albeit with 2 hull losses 1966 and 1999.
Today on here I read that TUI (was BY/BAL/TOM and merged later with AMM/FCA) now want to have their pilots fly both the 737 Max and the 787 as Smudge highlights above.
Two very different launch platforms usually operating very diffident mission patterns, although the 787 does op regular short haul in the summer to the Med.
I know that 757/767 was on the same ticket but those 2 a/c were designed from the outset to be dual rated as we know.
Last edited by rog747; 1st May 2018 at 17:59.