So let me summarise my, non-pilot, understanding of what occurred.
1. The original training system did not cover tactical low level flying, or the limits of the aircraft performance envelope. According 2nd tour pilots, including from non-tactical tours, were considered as suitable instructors.
2. Somewhere along the line the syllabus was expanded to include elements of tactical flying. No review of instructor background or experience was included and IPs without the required skill levels were appointed and neither given the required training or supervision for their duties.
3. Perhaps due to the undefined nature of the additional tactical training required, and perhaps induced by those experienced pilots who were happy with the entire skill set, the system allowed the IPs to introduce even more elements beyond even those required - and nobody in the chain of command queried the requirement creep or the qualifications of their subordinates to safely perform it.
4. Junior IPs, encouraged by the ethos around them, and without adequate supervision, are now performing training both outside the syllabus and their own training, and perhaps ability, without realising the danger - and without knowing it.
5. The inevitable happened.
Two questions immediately arise. Firstly, were any flags waved by anyone in the training system prior to the accident. Secondly, was the failure caused by a fault in the training design/review system or someone overriding the system?
Was this a case not over a cocky IP killing his student, or a fatally flawed system killing both an IP unqualified for the tasks he was attempting to perform and his student? If so, where did, or does, the responsibility lie?