Originally Posted by
Lonewolf_50
:Mishap reports are not for public release.
Do you mean the FOIA requests for the results of the JAG investigation? Any mishap that results in a fatality, or that has pilot error as a contributory cause, will typically have a JAG investigation as well. I've seen the JAG investigations take more time than the mishap investigations before.
Maybe they are not for public release but here's 81 pages of the command investigation report into the mishap with endorsements:
https://news.usni.org/2018/04/16/fin...-goshawk-crash
As you suggest, the missing qual seems to be a paperwork error. I don't see anywhere that the instructor wasn't qualified to fly the T-45.
Originally Posted by
Airbubba
The former VT-7 skipper has retired. Will CNATRA (Rear Adm. Bynum) step down as well?
Originally Posted by
Lonewolf_50
For what?
Since the admiral cites a culture at CNATRA at large to go beyond the curriculum and a failure of leadership to oversee training operations as contributors to the cause of the accident it almost sounds like he's falling on his own sword. But, maybe not.
Both the skipper and the commodore have already retired. The commodore had already put in his papers before the mishap. Oddly enough, I met both of these men at a TW-1 ceremony at Navy Meridian a couple of years ago. The field is named after Senator John Mc Cain III's grandfather, Admiral John S. Mc Cain, Sr. (John Junior was an admiral as well).
Rather, this mishap resulted from individual pilot error, a culture within VT-7, and Chief of Naval Air Training (CNATRA) at large, which fostered IPs and SNAS flying their aircraft beyond the bounds of approved Naval Air Training Command (NATRACOM) curriculum, and a failure of leadership to oversee training operations to ensure strict adherence to all approved publications.
From the admiral's endorsement of the command mishap report in the link above:
Executive Summary
a. On Sunday, 1 October 2Ol7, at approximately 1600 local (EDT), a T-45C jet aircraft assigned to Training Squadron SEVEN (VT-7) and piloted by LT Patrick Ruth (Instructor Pilot (IP)) and LTJG Wallace Burch (Student Naval Aviator (SNA)), impacted an isolated area of the mountainous National Forest near Tellico Plains, Tennessee. Tragically, neither the IP nor the SNA survived the crash.
b. The cause of the mishap was not due to mechanical, maintenance, or weather related issues. The cause of the mishap is not related to a physiological episode on the part of either the IP or the SNA nor due to inadequate written training procedures or directions. Rather, this mishap resulted from individual pilot error, a culture within VT-7, and Chief of Naval Air Training (CNATRA) at large, which fostered IPs and SNAS flying their aircraft beyond the bounds of approved Naval Air Training Command (NATRACOM) curriculum, and a failure of leadership to oversee training operations to ensure strict adherence to all approved publications.
c. The mishap flight was the second leg of a properly scheduled Operational Navigation (ONAV) Low Altitude Awareness Training (LAAT) flight on an approved military training route (MTR). The aircrew was returning to their home base of Naval Air Station Meridian, as the final event in an approved weekend cross-country mission during which several ONAV LAAT training events were conducted.
d. As documented in the Second Endorsement, the IP was “flat hatting” (flight conducted at low altitude and/or a high rate of speed for thrill purposes) during various parts of this particular cross-country training event, and actively encouraged/instructed his SNA to follow his example.
The investigation further demonstrated that this IP was overly confident, nonchalant, and aggressive at low altitude training, with limited awareness of the performance capabilities of the T-45C in the LAAT environment. This attitude influenced the IP’s instructional style, and conditioned the SNA to fly the aircraft in an aggressive manner, without correction from the IP.
e. At the time of the mishap, events were being flown at the direction of the IP that exceeded approved training curriculum, specifically tactical type maneuvers. This included aggressive ridgeline crossings and descending tums that took them below the minimum altitude of 500 feet above ground level (AGL) many times, to include potentially as low as 210 feet AGL. Per the written syllabus they should not have been operating so close to the limits of the aircraft’s performance. Such advanced skills and abilities are the responsibility of the Fleet Replacement Squadrons (FRSS) to train and are not part of the NATRACOM curriculum.
f. Approximately 35 seconds before the mishap, the IP told the SNA that they would deviate from the direct line of the MTR in order to follow terrain. The IP assumed control of the aircraft 26 seconds before mishap, and commenced a descending tum to demonstrate terrain following techniques. The IP nonchalantly returned the aircraft to the SNA I0 seconds before the mishap, and then instructed the SNA to make a hard right tum. What neither the IP nor SNA knew was that they were too slow and too low relative to the rising terrain in front of them and that the attempted control input to recover was beyond the limitations of the aircraft. In response to their maneuvers the aircraft entered into a stall. By the time the aircrew realized they were in extremis, it was too late to eject safely.