Is it really 28 years since this happened?
I have kept quiet about this accident for a long time, as Jerry had been a good friend and mentor of mine. He was the nav 1 on the first crew I joined on 205 Sqn in Singapore, and for a brief period he was my Captain (or I was his 1st Pilot) on 8 Sqn. In my own opinion the seeds of this accident were sown when 8 Sqn formed, and despite the best efforts of the front end crews - almost all ex maritime - all the old Coastal Command/Maritime SOPs, which had been produced through experience and trial and error (and accidents) over the previous decades, were rejected by the AEW side of the Sqn as unnecessary (they were used to flying in the Gannet at greater heights without any of the 'peculiarities' of the Shackleton); not only unnecessary but on AEW Course 1 the new AEW leader (ex RN) with no Shackleton experience stated that his operators would not apply any of them nor recognise them.
One of the major ones was the SOP for the radar operator to call 'land on track' (normally at 4 miles) just in case the Nav was otherwise occupied - this was deemed an unnecessary distraction by him and WOULD NOT BE DONE, Besides, AN/APS 20(i) was not configured to see land!! However. all the guys I flew with seemed to be able to do so, even at relatively short range.
However, this did not mean it was not done - a quiet agreement on a crew normally led to it being called, although never when he was on board - but as it wasn't policy, with new crews it slowly died out anyway.
Of course, although an SOP similar to this might have prevented it, this was never mentioned at the BoI. There was criticism certainly of some of the ways the Sqn had evolved, but in the end most of the blame went towards the crew.
I should stress this is my own opinion, but as a founder member of the Sqn I was deeply saddened by the accident and the loss of some good people.
screws4jets if you wish to get in touch please PM me.