My ‘favourite’ recent example is Part 175.
An aeronautical data originator provides information and the information is published in the AIP. 367 days later the originator has yet to do a review of that information. The originator is a criminal, even if the published information remains complete and accurate in fact.
An aeronautical data originator provides information and the information is published in the AIP. During the following year the originator does a review of that information, but does not record the fact that the review happened, or its results. The organisation is a criminal, even if the published information remains complete and accurate in fact.
An aeronautical data originator provides information and the information is published in the AIP. During the following year the originator does a review of that information, and makes and keeps a record of the fact that the review happened and its results. During the second year the originator does a second review and makes and keeps a record of the fact that the second review happened and its results, but throws the record of the first review in the bin. The originator is a criminal, even if the published information remains complete and accurate in fact.
It’s criminalising people because they fail to be good bureaucrats.
The “safety” regulator is so disconnected from reality that it forgot to deal with the substantive safety issue as elements of the offences: First, that the published information is inaccurate and, secondly, that the inaccuracy creates a material risk to safety. Not all inaccuracies result in a risk to safety.
I imagine the “safety” regulator would say that it would not pursue regulatory action in the cases in which an inaccuracy did not result in a risk to safety. But that attitude is again why “safety” bureaucracy has such a stultifying effect. Who is going to take the risk of the bureaucracy exercising its discretion in that way, when the law on its face is clear? You’re a criminal for not being a good bureaucrat, even if the outcome creates no risk to safety. It’s no wonder a couple of thousand aerodrome/HLS operators told the regulator and Airservices to stick Part 175 up their a*se.