Problem is, crews are no longer allowed to demonstrate airmanship. Everything on the North Sea is done by a manual which is great until you come across something that is not in the manual. If it is not in the manual then the immediate reaction is to ask a manager. Our ability to dynamically risk assess has been worn away by procedures and rules written by people who have never done it, done it and were useless or self-appointed experts. Unfortunately, when the unusual event happens, neither the manual nor the manager is of any use. Of course, there is a growing feeling that everything Sikorsky is good and everything Airbus is bad. This leads crews into thinking that the S92 is infallible - it ain’t. This is demonstrated on a near daily basis, there are just a lot of them which masks a lot of problems. To miss a HUMS warning is inexcusable, particularly if this kind of thing has happened before. Statistically, we are due another event and with activities levels about to rise without the experience and support of pre-downturn years, everyone needs to be on the ball.