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Old 21st Mar 2018, 18:27
  #49 (permalink)  
KenV
 
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Originally Posted by George K Lee
Boeing certainly should have understood the complexities of the KC-46 and, accordingly, submitted a proposal with realistic costs and schedule - and stuck to it.
Shoulda woulda coulda. The point is Boeing's proposal was VERY aggressive on cost and schedule to ensure they won. They succeeded. And Airbus succeeded in suckering Boeing into making such an aggressive bid (indeed, Airbus's bid was non-conforming as they proposed a tanker based on the passenger version rather than the freighter version of the A330 when a freighter door and freighter floor were spec requirements.) Actually delivering to the proposed price and schedule is an entirely different matter, but all on Boeing as it is a fixed price contract with penalties for late delivery.

The further point is that KC-46 has less than nothing to do with re-engining B-52s and why I did not include KC-46 in my post. You mentioning it here is a total red herring and yet another example of the butwhataboutery that is common in these sorts of threads.

Originally Posted by George K Lee
And as for C-5 RERP... "successfully"? It blew through Nunn-McCurdy and delivered 49 modded aircraft rather than the 108 originally planned.
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/RL34264.pdf
Did you actually read the report you cited? RERP included 70 initiatives to improve C-5 reliability, with the re-engine the centerpiece. The numbers of aircraft to be RERPed went down because the A model, which made up the majority of the fleet, were simply too far gone to warrant making such a major investment. Nunn-McCurdy was breached not because the estimated re-engine costs went up, but because as the actual condition of the C-5A fleet became known and the estimated cost of repairing them to make the re-engine investment worth it went way up. Once the C-5As were withdrawn as RERP candidates estimated costs went back down. Indeed, the actual costs of re-engining the B and C model aircraft (not the estimates which triggered Nunn-McCurdy) were slightly below estimates.

You also completely failed to understand the complex political dance that was going on when RERP was in the proposal stages and which is reflected in this old report. The MCS (Mobility Capability Study) and various other political moves of that period made retiring any C-5As impossible. Once the C-5A was taken off the table as a RERP candidate, almost everything changed. And the actual outcome of RERP proved the re-engine to be a success

So other than getting essentially all the facts wrong, nice rebuttal.
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