Indeed. (See my earlier) comprehensive QTPs for both equipment and installations will have been done.
Only one high speed sled test was carried out by MB for the GQ 5000 Tornado upgrade.
There were no independent witnesses. Some time after the test QinetiQ reported in 2002 that,
"The results recorded for the rear seat occupant ejection event (98-percentile) were successful, showing full parachute canopy inflation at 2.82s at a height of 36 feet above ground level". A tree level deployment seems a bit tight for me, with no consideration given for any sink rate.
The 2015 Air Commodities report does make it clear that,
"ACT is not in a position to underwrite the safety of the items on aircraft; this is the responsibility of the Platform PT and RTSA. The Platform PTs and RTSA must accept any hazards associated with the continued use of these systems, with the risks endorsed by the Duty Holder." Would like to see that endorsement. Prior to the introduction of Safety Assessment Reports (SARs) in 2015 recommendations were articulated in individual AECs/SCRs, however no AEC/SCR was prepared for the GQ5000. Furthermore, there is no Certificate of Design for GQ5000 and GQ1000.
The Air Commodities report also points out that "
The parachutes covered by this Safety Assessment Report are manufactured and supplied by Airborne Systems Ltd; either directly or via Martin-Baker Aircraft Ltd for seat-mounted parachutes, both being recognised internationally in the design, development and manufacture of parachute and aircraft escape systems. Airborne Systems Ltd is currently MOD Design Approved Organisation Scheme (DAOS) (ref: ALTG/07/03/11/291) approved for the equipment covered within this Safety Assessment Report, as is Martin-Baker Aircraft Company Ltd (ref: UK.MAA.DAOS.154), providing confidence that the company's' Quality, Safety and configuration management systems employed should be robust and effective."
It does appear that Airborne Systems and Martin Baker were allowed to carry out their work, unsupervised because of their 'good name' and reputation. Perhaps it is significant that on 22nd July 2014, after Tornado and Hawk accidents, the MoD drew up a tender document for the
“delivery of Safety Assessment Reports (SARs) to detail the safety arguments and supporting evidence for the Aircrew Escape and Survival (AES) equipment covering: risks to wearer, hazards to relevant air platforms and fitness for purpose”. The reason for doing this was that
“Aircrew Escape and Survival Safety Documentation does not satisfy current requirements, exposing Duty Holders legally and potentially Users to unknown or unquantified risks.”
DV