There are ICAO rules for the design of heliports (ICAO-Annex-14-V2). These rules are designed to put in place the first barrier to an undesirable event. In this case, TLOF and taxiway markings that conform to the largest aircraft for which the facility is designed to accommodate.
Looking at the pad from the images available its does not look like the safe distances have ever been properly laid out.
If this is the case, pilots get into the habit of landing on many, many occasions where nothing goes wrong. However, "Risky Shift" is now in play. Caused not only by the assumed inaccurate layout but also those occasions where the safety distances provided are further eroded by poor placement and inaccurate landings. Habit.......leads to complacency.
However, I agree with Crab and Hughes500. Despite all the efforts that should be made to provide safety distances, markings etc, the ultimate responsibility for the flight trajectory always remains with the pilot!
If you have not read ICAO-Annex 14 V2, and you are routinely making decisions as to how close you can land to objects, fuel installations, other aircraft etc! now would be a good time to refresh.
A few years back, operating in NW Oz, I faced a similar problems with a bunch of pilots willing and ready to take considerable risks while manoeuvring in the ground taxi in very large helicopters. They were all good professional pilots but in my opinion, were suffering from a severe dose of "Risky Shift". I was not fully able to solve this problem despite being in a supervisory position due to the ingrained and learned behaviours of the crews. Incredulously, several years prior to my experiences, there had been a helicopter collision on the same manoeuvring area due to the same factors present.
Sometimes, we as pilots are our own worst enemies in our pursuit of expedience.
I do not agree that the problem gets solved by punishment. However, with 16K in the logbook its hard to explain why "Risk Aversion" has not fully set in for the individual. Therefore it would be safe to assume, that despite the "Risky Shift" factors in play, the final act of the pilot in question has to be considered as "completely inappropriate to the conditions", and as such, search for underlying causes of distraction in the personal closet of the pilot.
Finally, to consider that "Rain" and "Visibility" etc was a factor, we are ignoring the principle that when operating in such conditions, additional margins of safety need to be applied. This again sits with the judgement of the pilot.
Clearly to me, judgement was impaired by "Risky Shift", ..........and some other factor(s). Determining what those other factors were, and addressing them, is important IF that pilot is to return to service.
However, if this pilot were to fly tomorrow, I suspect her personal safe distances she is prepared to accept have somewhat increased exponentially. She is highly unlikely to make this mistake again.