Originally Posted by
gulliBell
I don't care about the photos. A bad servo was fitted to the aircraft, we know that.
Dear gulliBell,
I have learn that you don't care about the photos. You remember well as you refused to see "erecting plasma flake in the C3 return port". You told me that you can't see anything wrong or anything unusual in the erecting plama flake in the picture. Do you still concur?
Servo Actuator was a good one but SIK was saving money by using old reworked pistons. The rework process was not at all a proper overhaul process. The SIK failed to follow FAA's approved overhaul instructions. The old plasma was stripped away by using a mechanical process despite of the approved chemical stripping process. This unapproved overhaul practice lead to the consequences where the diameter of origin of the piston became smaller and smaller after each rework turnaround. The accident servo actuators piston has been 9 times been reworked. The diameter of the origin of the piston was clearly less than the minimum diameter accepted by the FAA approved overhaul instructions.
This recycling of the used piston up to 9 times lead to the demand where the thickness of the plasma needed to be increased to reach the required final diameter of the piston.
The used plasma composition was not a proper and not as accepted by FAA's approved maintenance instructions. The approved composition should have been 80 % copper and 20 % aluminiun. The accident pistons and the whole patch of reworked pistons (which may still be in use and most likely are in daily flight operation) composition was 90 % of copper and 9,6 % aluminiun and 0,4 % titanium.
During the rework process the original S/N of the piston was over sprayed and due to this the mandatory requirement of Airworthiness which insists that aircrafts each component's or spare part's maintenance history must be reliably documented. Despite of the loss of this mandatory identification and tracking requirement all of the defected pistons patch were returned to the market by violating the mandatory airworthiness requirement.
SIK has had the knowledge of this serious flight safety issue already since late 70's but SIK decided to continue forward by passing the point of no return. SIK has had the knowledge that there has been "process related failure mode" during the overhaul process of the Servo Actuator Pistons.
FAA has this knowledge that accident helicopter servo actuator's pistons has been overhauled by violating the approved overhaul instructions. Also FAA has a knowledge of this piston's overhaul process has violated the approved instructions.
It is sad that the safety doesn't matter at all and everything will be hidden.
I have a capacity to prove the SIK knowledge. At the moment this issue is not only an issue of Sikorsky, it's now the issue of the owner of the SIK, the Lockheed Martin Corporation. My opinion is that Lockheed Martin's corporate culture derivates from past time Sikorsky's culture.
Every entity involved for the air safety, airworthiness has the proven knowledge of this above. I can now just wonder the consequences when the **** hits the rotor. It will bring up the question why the authorities let this going on. How many other lives must be lost?
Improper maintenance? What do you gullBell think about this Servo Actuator's overhaul process and SIK's violating of the mandatory FAA's overhaul instructions?