(that would have been a Local Technical Committee, until they were disbanded)
Key passage. The people who chaired LTCs were Technical Agencies, one of the most carefully controlled appointments in the airworthiness world. The most senior TA in any discipline (let's say, avionics, a world I'm familiar with) chaired the HQ Radio Mods Committee. He always had a deputy, because as a TA himself he would be submitting modifications and was not permitted to self-certify. These committees were themselves served by central registries. In this case, in the Directorate of Military Aircraft Projects. It was closed down in early 1993, to coincide with disbanding of the HQMC. Its voluminous records, which the very competent ladies could, as Engines says, access immediately, for any part of the history of the equipment or aircraft, were mostly destroyed, and some randomly archived. Not one TA knew the registry was to close until we turned up one day and it was empty.
I'll be kind here. This is why the Service Inquiry couldn't find the Safety Case Report or the evidence that MoD knew in 1990 of the mod that would eliminate the shackle pinching risk. But what it was also saying was that no one in the seat PT or aircraft PTs using Mk10 seat had any clue either. That, I can't believe.
Even if I extend my kindness, as soon as the 2002 report was released last month, it was incumbent upon MoD to immediately inform both HSE and judiciary that it had now uncovered the evidence (a) proving the SI wrong, (b) proving the Inquest had been misled, and (c) casting considerable doubt of the safety of the allegations made against M-B.
And we get back to the question - so why did M-B plead guilty to an easily defended charge? Not wanting to upset MoD simply doesn't cut it. I wonder what the MAA are thinking. It must be patently obvious that this case has set their work back 20 years or more. And given they haven't made much progress in 8 years, that's pretty serious.