Originally Posted by
gulliBell
You're barking up the wrong tree. The pilots didn't do the RFM mandatory after-start hydraulic checks ELEVEN TIMES in the previous 14 engine starts. Pilots who don't do the required flight critical checks, or who do them but don't understand what they are doing or why, are the naive ones..
Dear gulliBell,
First of the all I would like remind you that we had met September 13th, 2006 at Sikorsky S-76 Operators Conference. I know your identity and to whom you are working for. I’m the guy who has been able to see behind to the curtains by reading thousands and thousands Sikorsky’s internal documents related to the S-76 Servo Actuator. In addition, I have had an opportunity to read thousands and thousands of internal Sikorsky’s emails, emails between HR, FAA, NTSB etc. In these emails you have been partly involved as a receiver, sender of by cc. For example, I have seen 1445 different emails to and from FAA’s Kirk G. between SIK, HR, NTSB and FAA. It might be that I’m not barking up the wrong tree?
You should be more precise about Copterline 103’s mandatory after-start hydraulic checks allegation. The truth is that you should separate engine starts and actual number of flights where the engines have been running after 18 to 20 minutes flights. During these 14 flight sequences there has been three engines start-ups. The S-76 RFM mandatory after-start hydraulic checks are related only to the engines starts, not to the flight sequences where the engines will be ground idle during the helicopter ground time. The Copterline 103 Commander was type trained by Flight Safety West Palm Beach, with an earlier significant experience as an Bell 412 EP Commander of Finnish Border Guard Search and Rescue unit.
What about your reference to all proper procedure hadn’t been followed. Your arguments about missed after-start hydraulic checks, stick jump tests are improper and prejudiced to reach your intention and leads the dogs barking the wrong tree.
About your argument of “all proper procedure hadn’t been followed”. The Servo Actuator piston rework in Plasma Tech Inc. didn’t follow the FAA accepted overhaul instructions. The composition of the plasma that was used in Copterline 103 Servo Piston’s overhaul was wrong. The overhaul instructions which were used issued by HR was never accepted by the FAA. The maximum accepted thickness of plasma coating clearly exceeded the maximum approved by FAA. Servo Actuator design in late 70’s didn’t take into account the oversized plasma thickness, didn’t take into account that the plasma’s aluminiun composition is less than accepted 20 % (accident servo piston’s plasma had only 10 % composition of aluminiun) and Servo Design allows a malfunction which will block the MCV’s return ports (C3 ports) and the helicopter caution and warning system doesn’t detect any defect. This malfunction will lead to the situation where the helicopter will become suddenly unflyable….
This all was informed to Lockheed Martin Corporation at time when the acquisition process to acquire Sikorsky (due diligence) was still pending. The listed company Lockheed Martin Corporation’s highest level was informed for this possible flight safety concern which may have a type certification consequence. After evaluation where you have very likely participated, Lockheed Martin Corporation decided to proceed with the acquisition of Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation from United Technologies (UTC).
It looks that Sikorsky has passed the point of no return already on 25th of May, 1978 when the Servo Jam defect due to the plasma flakes was evidently detected by SIK. Also the consequences were evidently understood (loss of control of aircraft and fatal accident). If I’m right and if all the documents what I have been able to see are correct it might be that quite many involved entity have past the point of no return, not limited only present owner of the Sikorsky, Lockheed Martin Corporation and its shareholders. It looks that there is a high possibility that we are not far away from the time when the **** will hit the rotor. If this will make the helicopter industry to be more focused for aircraft safety and be more creditable. This will not be bad at all.
The documentation what I have been able to see is the ground of the origin of my thoughts.
