Cent #85, flap 40-15.
This illustrates one of the problems of procedural teaching; the accident crew were in a GA mindset, whereas due to the RA/AT malfunction recovery from an approach to the stall was required.
With the continuing focus on procedures, situations may be considered the same without checking for differences or need to adapt.
Thus expecting a stall recovery procedure to be the same at high altitude and low altitude might not be correct. Unstalling the wing by reducing the AoA would be consistent, but the subsequent recovery might vary with altitude, weight, configuration, etc. Crews have to be prepared to reassess stressful situations and modify procedures accordingly.
I suspect that the absence of detail in the Boeing procedure for high level stall refects the above, where the answer is ‘it all depends’. Unfortunately there is less understanding or ability to judge what ‘it’ is.
Re my #82, lest anyone thinks that they can recover from a stall at low altitude within 800ft, then reconsider terrain profiles and obstacle clearance.
The safety lesson is to focus training on how to avoid an approach to the stall particularly in the descent and approach phases of flight, and not low altitude stall recovery. This training would provide greater consistency and avoid the need for surprising situation assessment and emergency procedure recall.