I think the case is:
. the normal operating technique for opening the reversers is after MLG touch-down
. the reversers open notmally, the inhibit feature is set-up that it is indeed possible as per AFM / certification
. the on-board monitoring system used by maintenance does however
- have logic that on ground = NLG
- reports a false positive of failure: reversers open before supposed to
. quite likely crews do not see any of this, their FWC is coded properly
As a consequence, for all the landings when reversers are open in a timely and correct manner (at MLG touchdown) the poor guys at MCC
- receive (string of) messages from the on-board monitoring system
- telling them the REVs did open too early, i.e. without NLG on ground
- everybody knows it's a false positive
- it's not an airworthiness issue because only the MX monitioring system is affected
- it creates HEAPS of unnecessary workload when the engineers need to formally investigate, troubleshoot and close with no fault found every single of those false-positive messages (quality control on their side).
- they'd rather be doing something productive, like fixing aeroplanes or preventig them from breaking down.
Hodd: Do I understand correctly that: You have a plan to PATCH the ground-based part of the MX monitoring system
- so that the false-positive REV UNLK before TCHDN messages would be discarded automatically
- because the root FIX in the on-board part of the MX monitoring system is just not coming (yet): A/C type either too old, too new or too unique