Here is the threat. Childish as my views may seem to Bob, this is not about my right to know, it's about everyone's right to have everyone know. Telling the world why that Hawk went dark is not a threat to national security, however it might well be a threat to commercial opportunities for the people at Warton.
Despite the clear rules, people eventually do things in a different manner, and for a while it's all good. Then someone dies, and in the aftermath, we learn (again) the lessons of years ago.
We all know about the foam in the C130 fuel tanks, so there is little or no chance of a C130 going into a combat zone without that and nobody being aware.
The situation with the Hawk T2 however.... Imagine the scene in 15 years from now, and three contractors later, nobody still on the flight line at Valley from last summer.
Because it has been kept quiet, nobody talks about it, so it never gets passed down the line, and the same bad practice creeps in, for the same reason that it crept in last time.
A solo student is caught out, this time at night, and he (understandably) collides with an airliner.
Who are the MoD going to blame that on?
Back to the thread topic.....
I might have misunderstood, but I thought that, and I'm happy to be corrected here, MB have declared that the seat failed because the RAFAT mechanics failed to service the seat properly,
In a statement issued by the firm after entering the guilty plea, it said: "It should be noted that this was an isolated failure relating to the tightening of a nut during maintenance procedures conducted by RAF Aerobatic Team mechanics."
yet the report said the last work on the seat was carried out at Valley on 24th October.
On the basis that I'm right there, am I also right to say the RAFAT mechanics are in blue suits (literally) and the Valley people are civilian contractors? I'm genuinely asking, I've not been to Scampton, or Valley, for years.
As for the SI report, I found the bit at 1.4.5.23a & b quite interesting.
Section 1.4.5.24 directly contradicts Gilbert's assertion that good practice always evolves.
The term used is "incorrectly authorized deviation" when discussing the fact that the Reds had rules, that were not compliant with what had been agreed and written down, by the people responsible for agreeing and writing down the rules.
Why is it so hard for the RAF to find **** like that before someone dies? What on earth is going through the heads of people making changes to procedures, and not getting approval? How can anyone give approval without having checked the impact of the changes.
As for.......
"The positive picture of flight safety and the state of publications and pilot log books appears to be contrary to the findings in this Section.
It is the Panel's view that the Formal Staff Visit may not have provided the AOC with an accurate picture of the RAFAT upon which to base his report."
Sometimes you need to say it very clearly. Either the RAFAT suddenly went off the rails, big time, just after the AOC's inspection, or there wasn't much real inspecting getting done.