I think we need to be confident that there isn't other latent issues hiding in the MB design and safety management.
Years ago a friend was logging his first proper seat time; after contemplating the rather violent change of scenery he started wondering when the parachute would make its appearance. He even had the presence of mind to remember he had a high level barostat fitted to the seat so the chute should have made a relatively quick appearance. When he tried to move his hand to the manual separation release he found the the sleeves of his LSJ were bound so tightly between his legs and so much material had been stretched by the force of the restraints (with the restraint fabric pulled through to the metal clips) there was no way he could move his hand over his thigh, let alone across his kneepad to operate the handle. He then spent time trying to work his way free of the Houdini straight jacket.
The chute did deployed before he got to the manual handle. MB's response to this issue was initially dismissive of an issue before deciding that the seat eventually worked so why should he moan.
Quite a few of us revisited the seat rig to contemplate what would happen when the restraint cords were pulled beyond the stitching (not possible on the training rig) and contemplated how much LSJ material would be pulled tight around the shoulders by the power of the arm restraints. Those of us with knowledge of the accident opted for a shorter LSJ sleeve length but outside of this circle the issue was treated with derision.
In the years since the arm restraint design has spread across multiple types and judging by the number of long LSJ sleeves I see one hopes that the issue has been resolved rather than forgotten.
Before this accident my sleeve length looked like this; I do not know if Typhoon mitigates the issue in a different way or if the issue has carried over:
