PPRuNe Forums - View Single Post - Martin Baker to be prosecuted over death of Flt Lt. Sean Cunningham
Old 22nd Jan 2018, 16:57
  #307 (permalink)  
tucumseh
 
Join Date: Feb 2003
Location: uk
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This series of seats had numerous design issues. Some of these were communicated to some customers, but others were not.
The trouble with ejection seats is one cannot demonstrate the required System Integration Readiness Level as quickly as most other parts of an aircraft design; not least because one hopes that in-use experience is rare. The design evolution is not a normal iterative process. And one iteration does not necessarily lead directly to the next.

This means the reporting a feedback loop of the Safety Management System must be robustly implemented. MoD more or less stopped this in June 1993. It had already issued instructions to curtail Fault Investigations and Technical Publication amendments in 1991-2. That is a significant timeframe here.

M-B stand accused of not sending a single Camera Ready Copy of a Technical Bulletin to the Seat Engineering Authority. In 1990, that was small office, probably one man and his dog. But at least it was a single point of contact. But with successive re-organisations, such centralised functions were shut down (reiterated by Haddon-Cave). So, which new stove-pipe did the 1990 seat EA bring his single CRC to? Probably not Hawk. Tornado perhaps? If only because it was the single biggest user. The claim by the SI was that MoD could not find the bulletin. Did they track down the 1990 EA and ask him? At the Inquest this somehow morphed into M-B did not provide it, but it seems this was more a misunderstanding and clumsy wording than an accusation. In fact, M-B's solicitors were so unconcerned they paid little heed to this aspect - which I don't think served their client very well.

Place your self in the seat EA's shoes. He gets a bulletin saying 'don't over-tighten the nut'. He perhaps speaks to CSDE, who laugh at him. 'Teaching armourers to suck eggs, no way we're sponsoring a tech pubs amendment, ATP would laugh at us. And the money's been chopped anyway'. So, the seat EA does not need to take the next step, informing the aircraft EA. RAFHS at Boscombe don't get a sniff. It's marked 'no further action', and stuck in an anonymous file.

Then ask when we stopped employing Technical Authors for the Topic 4s. Around 500 posts chopped, and it was contracted out - at precisely this time. Allied to that, we heard of poorly trained MoD maintainers. When those changes (cuts) were being made, the Training Needs Analysis should have been updated, to recognise the new, lower levels of expertise. In turn, the Pubs Authority (ATP) would say 'Pubs need to be updated to reflect the more detailed instructions needed for non-specialists who are now maintaining seats'. It wasn't just M-B who had to find a new way of conveying technical information to a dumbed-down MoD. The 'trainers of the trainers' had this precise problem in 1992-3 when seeking to work out how to have Chinook FADEC maintained. And the Director of Flight Safety let rip at the Chief Engineer and ACAS over it:
There is a gap in the present orders and procedures concerning the amendment of Air Publications. The problem lies with the question of what the tradesmen do in the meantime. Do they to work to and sign for an activity which is known to be wrong, or do they work outside the content of the maintenance document and thus be hostage to fortune should a problem occur?’

None of this has anything to do with Martin-Baker.


Airworthiness directives and notifications are not something that can be lost due to MoD reorganisation.
Yes they are. When D/MAP registry closed down, following the announcement that HQ Mods Committees were being disbanded, thousands of files were never seen again. This was right in the middle of a 5-year 'freeze', when only the most critical projects were allowed to proceed. (In November 1994 I took over the top priority Support Helicopter programme, which had been endorsed in January 1990, but absolutely no progress had been made due to this freeze. As soon as the freeze was lifted, it was under contract in 48 hours. The first thing was a 4-phase risk reduction exercise to stabilize the airworthiness baseline, as it had lapsed in that time). Now, did this happen on seats? Probably. And it was nothing to do with M-B.
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