It surprises me greatly that nobody here mentioned that the safest way is easy: there was no reason for the captain to take over controls, the go-around should have continued even if started accidently. Safest option. Safest solution. Trying to recover from a started go-around is asking for problems, especially on a 737 with a hard power-pitch effect. Go-arounds are non-events, not really what you can say here...
Unfortunately the same lessons are being learnt over and over again. Why the decision to continue to land if this is the cause? Ego, embarrassment, management pressure, QAR, get-home-itus or for a multitude of unknown reasons.
If, and I stress if it turns out to be the case, then it would appear to be quite similar to QF1 in 1999 and the EK DXB 777 accidents.
QF1 was also a case of a "rejected go-around", that in hindsight, I'm sure the LHS if he had his time again would just have let the process of a missed approach to happen just as per procedure.
QF1 Accident report.
Originally Posted by RAT5
I have to admit being surprised by this error [inadvertent TOGA]. I've never seen it, but there were numerous memos to the trainers to insist on correct hand position because of it.
This is the essence of the problem, surprise leading to confusion, leading to error. There is actually very little academic literature about the mental state of confusion. Confusion takes time to resolve, and by the time our brains resolve the confusion, there may be insufficient time to fix the problem.
Close to the ground, confusion is to be avoided at all costs, SOP and only SOP will keep you safe 99.999% of the time. For all those times with a minuscule probability, you just have to make it up & hope your brain can perceive things clearly & quickly enough to resolve the scenario safely. In the case of the EK DXB777, the FO followed SOP to the letter, but failed to notice the mistake of TOGA being pushed after main gear weight-on-wheels thereby that it disabling it.
As I said, there is almost no work done on this state of mind & decision making. It is worth examining your own mental processes at work, to determine just how much of the time that you end up in this state, and how long it takes to resolve. You have to be honest about it to yourself.
The opposite state also occurs, where you are in a state of "
flow".
In positive psychology, flow, also known as the zone, is the mental state of operation in which a person performing an activity is fully immersed in a feeling of energized focus, full involvement, and enjoyment in the process of the activity. In essence, flow is characterized by complete absorption in what one does, and a resulting loss in one's sense of space and time.
In this state, time is slowed, and everything is clear, and error resolution is much easier. However, as pilots we don't get to chose the timing of our mental states.
Recently in this state of flow, I observed a highly experienced fellow crew member make a MCP error. He was totally confused (arming APP early, capturing GS
before LOC capture, then immediately setting missed approach heading resulting in us turning away from the LLZ intercept). I could actually observe his surprise & confusion at what was happening, and his inability to resolve the solution (simply turning the heading back to original intercept). All I had to do was prompt him to set the heading and his confusion was immediately eliminated. In this instance, I could slowly and methodically observe each and every one of his touches of the MCP panel, and actually anticipate the error, and solution with ease.
I felt totally "in-tune" with both the aircraft, and other pilot making the mistake, that is a state of flow. My mental state of flow just happened to coincide with his error i
n this particular instance. This isn't always the case & I only tell the anecdote as an example of how our minds work sometimes, not self aggrandizement. I'm nothing special when it comes to aviation.