AAIB seem to have gone to considerable lengths to prove the plane could have climbed ok that day. However, worryingly, it showed that it could only survive a failure shortly after take off if the failed engine was feathered otherwise you lost 200 feet per minute and they were not much higher than that. In other words there was considerable pressure to do something quickly contrary to my suggestion of how pilots should handle emergencies.
I am quite concerned after reading the report. The pilot was very familiar with this aircraft and was highly qualified. He'd also done an engine failure practice very recently. Did he make a mistake or was there a coincidental minor problem with the second engine?
We learn also there was a surplus pilot on the flight deck. There was no recommendation along the lines of let the pilot flying concentrate on maintaining control and declaring the candidate failed engine (from control pressure) but leave the engine untouched until the second pilot confirms the engine by checking instruments and engine appearance etc.
Twisted's First Law:
With a two engine plane if you have one fail, and you switch one off, you risk having zero.