Originally Posted by
Bleve
Yes:
If you watch the simulator reconstruction of the event (posted above), you can see that after touchdown, the PF removes his hand from the Right Thrust Lever to deploy the Left Thrust Reversor (the Right Thrust Reversor is inop). Because TOGA had been inadvertently selected and the Autothrottle was still engaged, as soon as the PF’s hand came off the Right TL, the Right TL advanced to TOGA Thrust and the Takeoff Configuration Warning activated.
If I remember correctly after TAM at Sao Paulo, Airbus reviewed procedures for a single TR inop and put out guidance that
both levers should be fully retarded, thereby on a bus, cancelling the autothrottle. This was done, specifically to prevent runway excursions in the event the autothrottle had been accidentally been left in TOGA or CLM. This was seen as a procedural belt and braces beyond the various systemised safeguards.
In the 737 video the captain selects reverse for No 1, having left the autothrottle in TOGA, which produces an autothrottle commanded spool to N1 on No 2. if, and I mean if, the rumours are correct this will probably turn out to be a primary cause of the accident.
However, Boeing or Airbus, rumours true or otherwise, whenever a single TR is inop it seems to me that;
(1) If possible you would plan to land brakes only or
(2) If not possible/desirable you would have a heightened awareness of the interplay between the TR and associated systems such as spoilers and AT.
Either way the deployment of asymmetrical reverse thrust would feature significantly in the briefing.
As is usually the case additional pressures such as the cancelled go around, late decision height etc. seem to have contributed in lining up the holes. Hindsight is a great thing, but it now seems overriding the PF wasn't the smartest thing to do here. A go around together with second go at the landing config and briefing would have almost certainly saved the day.