if an Esso Captain thought a net was too small for a sling load job I'd be surprised he proceeded with the mission using that net
You may not be aware of the relationship between management and pilots. Used to be outstanding, but it changed.
The CEO's at one time used to be Australians, Jim Kirk and John Schubert immediately spring to mind, both would drop into the crewroom for a chat and coffee if they were in the vicinity. Then the Americans moved in, and as one non aviation manager told the assembled pilots in a conference room, "We (management) don't give a **** about you people. You people have it too good". Exact words, reason behind statement, they were a stable workforce.
Pilots used to be under their own award, administered by the AFAP, but the AFAP were just a rubber stamp, all negotiations were carried out by the pilots themselves. They were all suckered into becoming staff, and relations within the group changed. No more Fridays at the pub or socialising, it was every dog for himself. Reason? The yearly appraisal, which determined your pay rise. Such an appraisal system does not encourage stand up arguments with management. As I said previously, management attitude was you do what you're told, a PIC was PIC in name only, you had to do what management ordered, and bugger what the regs or ops manual said.
Jim Ward is a exemplar of the companies attitude towards its employees.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Esso_L..._gas_explosion
Esso blamed the accident on worker negligence, in particular Jim Ward, one of the panel workers on duty on the day of the explosion.
The findings of the Royal Commission, however, cleared Ward of any negligence or wrongdoing. Instead, the Commission found Esso fully responsible for the accident.
Other findings of the Royal Commission included:
1. the Longford plant was poorly designed, and made isolation of dangerous vapours and materials very difficult;
2. inadequate training of personnel in normal operating procedures of a hazardous process;
3. excessive alarm and warning systems had caused workers to become desensitised to possible hazardous occurrences;
4. the relocation of plant engineers to Melbourne had reduced the quality of supervision at the plant;
5. poor communication between shifts meant that the pump shutdown was not communicated to the following shift.
Certain managerial shortcomings were also identified:
1. the company had neglected to commission a HAZOP (HAZard and OPerability) analysis of the heat exchange system, which would almost certainly have highlighted the risk of tank rupture caused by sudden temperature change;
2. Esso's two-tiered reporting system (from operators to supervisors to management) meant that certain warning signs such as a previous similar incident (on 28 August) were not reported to the appropriate parties;
3. the company's "safety culture" was more oriented towards preventing lost time due to accidents or injuries, rather than protection of workers and their health.
Low level managers are just as much under the pump as those pilots on staff with regard to appraisals. Don't rock the boat is the message, do what you're told and you'll be rewarded come appraisal. The fact that pilots may be provided by HNZ, or some other entity, under contract, makes no difference to their standing. Rock the boat and we'll get someone who doesn't.
OIMS? Yes, good stuff, for lighting your campfire.