A no automation Zero Zero Landing with finesse
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I'm open to making the current version available for comment ...
You put it up and I'll take care of anything inappropriate in the responses ..
You put it up and I'll take care of anything inappropriate in the responses ..
OK. I will do it ASAP. It will need some background to be provided and might also need a bit of re-formatting as some of it is tabulated.
Last edited by slast; 12th May 2017 at 13:11.
A "best practice" example operations policy.
The thought behind this was to have a simple statement of principles that any operator could insert in its policy manual with minimal amendment. At present it seems that operators are adopting increasingly restrictive policies about the use of automation, which experienced pilots feel are actually inappropriate and even long term hazardous.
The objective here is to provide such operators with a rational and defensible framework to achieve a minimum risk to their overall operation. It could be adopted without "loss of face" and indeed it could be presented as a logical extension of their current restrictive policy.
Applying this would result in a default operation that results in the highest possible THEORETICAL degree of safety on every IFR approach, whatever the actual conditions. This would include all operational "worst cases" catered for in the ops manual. This is described in the opening section "Standard normal operations policy". It requires a "Pilot-in-charge Monitored Approach" (PiCMA), with the discretion for the Captain to take control above DH in defined conditions.
For preference I don't think we should debate the details or merits of the PiCMA procedure in this thread here, but my view is that it is essential to operators' acceptance of the subsequent manual practice during line operations. Amongst other things it means that inexperienced F/Os in particular can concentrate on instrument flying, and are not burdened with concerns about transition to visual cues and completion of the landing, which remain the Captain's responsibility.
After stating the default, high automation, procedure, the policy then allows the Captain (Commander) to use discretion to vary specific aspects of it, to trade the existence of increased safety margins in some aspects against reductions in others in a closely controlled manner.
This trade enables the operator to balance marginally increased short term risk to the individual flight against significantly reduced long term risk, to achieve the highest ACTUAL degree of safety across their operations as a whole.
The principal areas of discretion are in role reversal and manual practice. For both of these compensating conditions must be applicable - the detail of these may be company specific but the principles are obvious. They are applicable either separately or simultaneously.
____________________________________________________________ ____
A "best practice" example operations policy - draft for discussion.
1. Standard normal operations policy.
For all IFR approaches (regardless of expected weather) duty allocations will in accordance with the tabulated PicMA procedure, including all specified call-outs, and terminate in an automatic landing if available.
1. The Captain as P1 will monitor the approach and make the landing.
2. If landing, the Captain will take control following the "Decide" call at Decision Height.
3. Autoland will be used if available, if not the autopilot should remain engaged to the lowest permitted altitude for the type of approach in use.
4. The F/O as P2 will fly the approach and go-around.
5. The F/O will use the aircraft's auto-flight capabilities to the maximum available extent.
6. The F/O will resume Pilot Monitoring duties after the Captain takes control, with particular emphasis on monitoring of flight path by instruments.
7. When an IFR approach terminates in a visual circuit, visual circuit procedures will apply from the point where the approach is broken off.
At the Captain's discretion, he/she may resume control above DH/MDA provided the following criteria are met:
1. The aircraft is established on final approach in stable landing configuration.
2. The probability of a go-around due to inadequate visual reference is nil (e.g. touchdown point is visible).
3. The probability of a go-around due to other factors is low (e.g. runway clear etc).
2. Role reversal.
Captains should use their discretion to allow role reversal (operation in the P1 role by the F/O and the P2 role by the Captain), in appropriate circumstances. This means:
1. The weather expected at the time of the approach is better than [relevant Company First Officer minima].
2. Both crew members meet [relevant company criteria].
3. If any non-normal aircraft condition arises or other circumstances change, once the appropriate checklist items and other immediate safety items have been completed, the Captain should assess whether conditions now require that the role reversal should be terminated for the remainder of the flight with the Captain operating in the P1 role.
3. Manual flying practice.
During normal operations, at the Captain's discretion and after considering the additional impact on workload for both pilots in the prevailing weather and other circumstances:
1. The Captain may allow the First Officer to disconnect elements of automatic guidance systems at any point during the approach.
2. Each element disconnected should result in increased emphasis on purely instrument monitoring of the flight path by the Pilot Monitoring, i.e. the P1 prior to resuming control, and the P2 subsequently.
3. Disconnection is similarly permitted during role reversal sectors, provided the Captain is confident that the First Officer understands the additional monitoring emphasis.
4. If either pilot considers that workload is becoming excessive, autopilot and autothrust must be re-engaged.
5. The [example below] criteria must be fulfilled.
Desired practice: Minimum conditions.
Manual flying, flight director and autothrust engaged: IMC, destination weather better than 1000ft/5 miles
Manual flying, raw data, autothrust engaged: VMC, day or night. PM must set flight director modes appropriately
Manual flying, flight director, manual thrust: VMC day. PM must set flight director modes appropriately
Manual flying, raw data, manual thrust: VMC, day. PM must set flight director modes. PF must have minimum 1000 hours or 400 sectors on type.
The objective here is to provide such operators with a rational and defensible framework to achieve a minimum risk to their overall operation. It could be adopted without "loss of face" and indeed it could be presented as a logical extension of their current restrictive policy.
Applying this would result in a default operation that results in the highest possible THEORETICAL degree of safety on every IFR approach, whatever the actual conditions. This would include all operational "worst cases" catered for in the ops manual. This is described in the opening section "Standard normal operations policy". It requires a "Pilot-in-charge Monitored Approach" (PiCMA), with the discretion for the Captain to take control above DH in defined conditions.
For preference I don't think we should debate the details or merits of the PiCMA procedure in this thread here, but my view is that it is essential to operators' acceptance of the subsequent manual practice during line operations. Amongst other things it means that inexperienced F/Os in particular can concentrate on instrument flying, and are not burdened with concerns about transition to visual cues and completion of the landing, which remain the Captain's responsibility.
After stating the default, high automation, procedure, the policy then allows the Captain (Commander) to use discretion to vary specific aspects of it, to trade the existence of increased safety margins in some aspects against reductions in others in a closely controlled manner.
This trade enables the operator to balance marginally increased short term risk to the individual flight against significantly reduced long term risk, to achieve the highest ACTUAL degree of safety across their operations as a whole.
The principal areas of discretion are in role reversal and manual practice. For both of these compensating conditions must be applicable - the detail of these may be company specific but the principles are obvious. They are applicable either separately or simultaneously.
____________________________________________________________ ____
A "best practice" example operations policy - draft for discussion.
1. Standard normal operations policy.
For all IFR approaches (regardless of expected weather) duty allocations will in accordance with the tabulated PicMA procedure, including all specified call-outs, and terminate in an automatic landing if available.
1. The Captain as P1 will monitor the approach and make the landing.
2. If landing, the Captain will take control following the "Decide" call at Decision Height.
3. Autoland will be used if available, if not the autopilot should remain engaged to the lowest permitted altitude for the type of approach in use.
4. The F/O as P2 will fly the approach and go-around.
5. The F/O will use the aircraft's auto-flight capabilities to the maximum available extent.
6. The F/O will resume Pilot Monitoring duties after the Captain takes control, with particular emphasis on monitoring of flight path by instruments.
7. When an IFR approach terminates in a visual circuit, visual circuit procedures will apply from the point where the approach is broken off.
At the Captain's discretion, he/she may resume control above DH/MDA provided the following criteria are met:
1. The aircraft is established on final approach in stable landing configuration.
2. The probability of a go-around due to inadequate visual reference is nil (e.g. touchdown point is visible).
3. The probability of a go-around due to other factors is low (e.g. runway clear etc).
2. Role reversal.
Captains should use their discretion to allow role reversal (operation in the P1 role by the F/O and the P2 role by the Captain), in appropriate circumstances. This means:
1. The weather expected at the time of the approach is better than [relevant Company First Officer minima].
2. Both crew members meet [relevant company criteria].
3. If any non-normal aircraft condition arises or other circumstances change, once the appropriate checklist items and other immediate safety items have been completed, the Captain should assess whether conditions now require that the role reversal should be terminated for the remainder of the flight with the Captain operating in the P1 role.
3. Manual flying practice.
During normal operations, at the Captain's discretion and after considering the additional impact on workload for both pilots in the prevailing weather and other circumstances:
1. The Captain may allow the First Officer to disconnect elements of automatic guidance systems at any point during the approach.
2. Each element disconnected should result in increased emphasis on purely instrument monitoring of the flight path by the Pilot Monitoring, i.e. the P1 prior to resuming control, and the P2 subsequently.
3. Disconnection is similarly permitted during role reversal sectors, provided the Captain is confident that the First Officer understands the additional monitoring emphasis.
4. If either pilot considers that workload is becoming excessive, autopilot and autothrust must be re-engaged.
5. The [example below] criteria must be fulfilled.
Desired practice: Minimum conditions.
Manual flying, flight director and autothrust engaged: IMC, destination weather better than 1000ft/5 miles
Manual flying, raw data, autothrust engaged: VMC, day or night. PM must set flight director modes appropriately
Manual flying, flight director, manual thrust: VMC day. PM must set flight director modes appropriately
Manual flying, raw data, manual thrust: VMC, day. PM must set flight director modes. PF must have minimum 1000 hours or 400 sectors on type.
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From the currently prevailing perspective, it is a "given" that automation reduces pilot workload and improves efficiency.
With a pilot who is relaxed flying an aircraft manually it may actually be the case that the parasitic workload of managing the automation is greater than the workload using the learned skill of flying an aircraft manually. At the other end of the scale are the pilots who rely on automation and given a sudden reversion to manual flying (direct law) will be unable to cope with the perceived workload due to lack of (continuation) training - this would seem to apply to probably a majority of younger pilots.
Unless as suggested in SLAST's 'Best Practice' pilots ensure that they have practice in manual flying, the next step will be full automation and reduced crewing as the unpracticed flight crew 'cannot take over' in any case.
Ian, just for clarity, by "currently prevailing perspective" I meant that of the managements that are predominantly putting excessive emphasis on automation. I disagree with them and I agree with your point.
Thread Starter
Apropos the subject matter under discussion. Strongly recommend the article "The Rise of the Machines" by journalist Matt O'Sullivan in the Saturday "Age" (Good Weekend magazine 13 May 2017) where he interviews Qantas Captain Kevin Sullivan who was flying QF 72, an A330 from Singapore to Perth on 7 October 2008 when a serious computer defect caused a jet upset. Five pages of riveting reading.
ATSB Report: https://www.atsb.gov.au/publications...-2008-070.aspx
ATSB Report: https://www.atsb.gov.au/publications...-2008-070.aspx
Amongst other things it means that inexperienced F/Os in particular can concentrate on instrument flying,
and are not burdened with concerns about transition to visual cues and completion of the landing,
Are they not required to demonstrate their competency to a command standard during instrument rating tests? Or is that only on automatic pilot controlled approach and landing?
Excellent article, thanks Centaurus
The untold story of QF72: What happens when 'psycho' automation leaves pilots powerless?
The untold story of QF72: What happens when 'psycho' automation leaves pilots powerless?
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Interesting new FAA SAFO (5/4/2017)
New FAA SAFO 17007! interesting reading material!
An extract:
An air carriers line operations policy should permit and encourage manual flight operations and should
incorporate the following:
1. Encouragement to manually fly the aircraft when conditions permit, including at least periodically,
the entire departure and arrival phases, and potentially the entire flight, if/when practicable and
permissible.
2. When deciding to fly manually, crews should apply basic threat and error management principles
and take into account the various factors affecting operational workload. Factors to consider
include:
Weather conditions, terrain, and/or other environmental threats
Time of day
Psychological and/or physiological factors
Level of crew experience
Traffic density
Condition of the aircraft, and/or any non-normal conditions
Air Traffic Control and/or instrument procedural challenges
Any other operational threats
Distributed by: AFS-200 OPR: AFS-280
3. Allow pilots to conduct manual flight with all approved combinations of automation based on
aircraft equipage, e.g.,
FD on, AP off, AT on
FD on, AP off, AT off
FD off, AP off, AT off
FD on, AP on, AT off
An extract:
An air carriers line operations policy should permit and encourage manual flight operations and should
incorporate the following:
1. Encouragement to manually fly the aircraft when conditions permit, including at least periodically,
the entire departure and arrival phases, and potentially the entire flight, if/when practicable and
permissible.
2. When deciding to fly manually, crews should apply basic threat and error management principles
and take into account the various factors affecting operational workload. Factors to consider
include:
Weather conditions, terrain, and/or other environmental threats
Time of day
Psychological and/or physiological factors
Level of crew experience
Traffic density
Condition of the aircraft, and/or any non-normal conditions
Air Traffic Control and/or instrument procedural challenges
Any other operational threats
Distributed by: AFS-200 OPR: AFS-280
3. Allow pilots to conduct manual flight with all approved combinations of automation based on
aircraft equipage, e.g.,
FD on, AP off, AT on
FD on, AP off, AT off
FD off, AP off, AT off
FD on, AP on, AT off
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@Judd, based on your post #18 in this thread I'll bet you are one of those sim instructors with whom pilots strive to train. Although I have no jet aspirations (I'm a lowly Navajo pilot in the bush), your writing tempts me to come do a rating with you. Please continue sharing your wisdom and experience here!
